

Paper for Session 93: Europe and the Maghreb: demographic ties

MEDITERRANEAN EUROPE AND THE MAGHREB: ARE MIGRATION FLOWS DETERMINED BY DIFFERENCES IN POPULATION STRUCTURE?

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1. Introduction: the debate on the role of population structure

Taking the Western Mediterranean region as an example, the present paper aims to contribute to the debate on whether differences in population structure between world regions are a demographic determinant of the relationships between them. The recent evolution of the population structures in the Southern European Mediterranean countries and that of North African ones will be compared to this end, as well as differences in education and labour market participation.

The Mediterranean region, with 479 million inhabitants living in its countries in 2005, has become an example of a potential conflict in which the different population structures of rich and poor countries would be the basis of their future confrontation, (Courbage, 2009). In this sense, the Mediterranean has become a paradigm of an alleged demographic fracture, used to argue the so called “clash of civilisations”. Samuel P. Huntington (1996) stated that population growth differentials between Spain and the Maghreb, Palestine and Israel or Serbia and the Kosovo Albanese population would be one of the factors explaining past, present and future conflicts in the Mediterranean region.

Though far from this extreme interpretation, there are also two well-known demographic theoretical approaches based on the differences in population structure, which emphasise the consequences of the future evolution of the population structure on countries' socio-demographic progress. We refer to the so called “replacement migrations” theory, born with the famous 2001 United Nations Population Division report *Replacement migration: is it a solution to declining and ageing populations*,

which relates migratory flows and population structure differences (Lesthaeghe, 2000). There is also the so called “demographic dividend” or “demographic opportunity window” approach (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2002), which refers to the hypothetically beneficial demographic situation that can currently be found in transitional countries, where the share of dependant population (children and elderly people) diminishes while the number of active persons reaches its maximum.

Both approaches continue to have a strong influence within and outside demography, particularly when analysing relationships between European countries and the Maghreb, or those within Mediterranean region in general. However, these positions have also been, to a higher or lesser extent, rejected. On one hand, “Replacement migration” theories have been criticized by diverse authors, especially A David Coleman, who shows, with an acid humour, that the world’s population would not be enough to cover the South Korea’s structural deficit (Coleman, 2001). On the other hand, there are authors who have also intended to refute the “replacement migrations” theory by pointing out that there are presently strong international migration flows between countries with similar fertility levels and age structures, For instance, the strong movements within the Gulf of Guinea or within Southern Africa despite having similar high fertility rates and young age structures. At the other end of the scale, we would find East European citizens migrating towards the European Union countries, despite the fact that their countries of origin have an even lower fertility level than that of the destination ones (Weiner and Teitelbaum, 2001). However, neoclassical economic theories applied to migrations continue to have their value within and outside demography – replacing the former role of salary differences by present variation in population structure as the main cause of migration.

In the same way, as some authors have pointed out, the optimistic perspective for developing countries based on the “demographic opportunity window” hypothesis, fails to consider to what extent the productive economy of these countries, that of the countries Maghreb for example, has the capacity to absorb the young workforce which will be generated in the following years (Asaad and Roudi-Fahmi, 2007; Reher, 2009). Similarly, education improvements by sex and age should also be taken into account by those approaches, like “replacement migration” and “demographic dividend”, which focus on the consequences of existing large differences in population structures -e.g. between the European and African Mediterranean countries.

This paper aims to enter this debate by analysing the incidence of a series of factors on the migration flows from South Western Mediterranean countries (Morocco, Alger and Tunis) to North Western Mediterranean ones (France, Spain and Italy). Firstly, these six countries have been selected on the basis of the importance of current migration flows and stocks (section 2). Then, the role of differences in population growth and age structures in both sides of the Mediterranean has been analysed in section 3. Section 4 focuses on the education and labour participation differences as a factor feeding migration flows between both groups of countries. Finally, section 5 summarises the paper's main findings and places them within the current discussion on the main factors driving migration flows.

2. Quantifying population from the Maghreb in southern European Mediterranean countries: stocks and flows

We have analysed South Western Mediterranean –from now on, Maghrebi– population stocks living in European Mediterranean countries, and flows between these two areas, to select the countries which should be included in the study. Even though as Fargues (2005, 2009), Domingo and Esteve (forthcoming) or Salt and Almeida for all the EU countries (2006) argue, numbers vary considerably according to the source¹, Maghrebi population seems clearly to be concentrated in only three destination countries: France, Spain and Italy, in order of importance. Numbers in Greece, Cyprus Malta and Slovenia are really insignificant. Similarly, most of the exits from the Arab Maghreb Union are from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, while Libya and Mauritania have a particularly minor role. Therefore, this paper is going to concentrate on migrations from Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia to France, Spain and Italy.

Table 1 shows stocks of Maghrebi nationals in the three European countries, according to Eurostat's most recent available data. There are nearly one and a half million Moroccans in these three European countries, in comparison with, according to Moroccan statistics, 2.6 million in the EU as a whole (Fargues, 2005: 373). About 550,000 Algerians and a quarter of a million Tunisians also live in France, Spain and

¹ For instance, depending on whether the data source belong to the country of origin or destination, according to the criteria used (nationality or country of birth), or depending on whether migrant's descendants ("second generations" and following ones) are included or not.

Italy. While Morroccans are distributed among the three countries, those from Algeria concentrate in France and Tunisians have mainly settled in France and Italy.

According to receiving countries' data, on January the 1st 2008 there were 700,000 North Africans from the analysed countries living in Spain, representing nearly 1.6% of the total population and more than 13% of the total number of foreign residents. More than 90% of them are Moroccans, representing 1.44% of the population living in Spain on their own, and nearly 12.5% of all foreigners, being the second most represented nationality in Spain, only after Rumanians. Much further down come little more than 50.000 Algerians (less than 1% of all foreign residents living in Spain) and, finally, 2,000 Tunisians. The latter can be considered merely symbolic, as Spain's historical relationships with Tunisia were much less intense than those established with the other two, and particularly with Morocco.

Table 1. Absolute and relative numbers of people with Algerian, Moroccan or Tunisian nationality or born in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia living in Spain, France and Italy. Most recent available data.

	Absolute numbers					
	Spain		France		Italy	
	Nationality	Country of birth	Nationality	Country of birth	Nationality	Country of birth
Algeria	51,552	54,110	477,495	1,345,560	22,672	-
Morocco	649,818	664,948	461,465	837,840	365,908	-
Tunisia	1,732	2,324	146,514	364,348	93,601	-
Foreign Total	5,262,095	5,894,401	3,674,000	6,836,942	3,432,651	-
	45,283,259		62,868,202		59,619,290	
Relative numbers of people by nationality (% distribution)						
	Spain		France		Italy	
	% total pop.	% foreigners	% total pop.	% foreigners	% total pop.	% foreigners
Algeria	0.11	0.98	0.76	13.00	0.04	0.66
Morocco	1.44	12.35	0.73	12.56	0.61	10.66
Tunisia	0.00	0.03	0.23	3.99	0.16	2.73
Foreign Total	11.62	100.00	5.84	100.00	5.76	100.00
Total	100.00		100.00		100.00	
Relative numbers of people by country of birth (% distribution)						
	Spain		France		Italy	
	% total pop.	% born abroad	% total pop.	% born abroad	% total pop.	% born abroad
Algeria	0.12	0.92	2.14	19.68	-	-
Morocco	1.47	11.28	1.33	12.25	-	-
Tunisia	0.01	0.04	0.58	5.33	-	-
Foreign Total	13.02	100.00	10.88	100.00	-	-
Total	100.00		100.00		-	

Source: Eurostat migration data - 2008 data for Spain and Italy, 2005 data for France.

Therefore, talking about Maghrebi immigration in Spain is doing so on Moroccans. As a percentage of the population coming from Morocco does not have that

nationality, either because it never had it (Spanish people born in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco in colonial times should be included here) or because they have acquired other ones, particularly the Spanish one, its demographic impact is still greater. As it can be seen in table 1, there are 15,000 more individuals born in Morocco than people of this nationality living in Spain. On the other hand, part of the Moroccans, concentrated at the base of the pyramid, can not exactly be considered as immigrants as they have been born in Spain, even though they are the descendants of Moroccan immigrants and preserve their parents' nationality.

There are about half a million people from the Maghreb in Italy, and also here Moroccan nationals are the biggest group. They are the third biggest community in the country after Rumanians and Albanese. Their 366,000 nationals represent 11% of all foreigners living in Italy. However, unlike in Spain, they are followed by nearly 100,000 Tunisians, and, at a great distance, almost 23,000 Algerians. In France, on the contrary, the latter would be the biggest community out of the three analysed. This country has one million Maghrebi residents and nearly 480,000 of them are Algerians. Alone they represent 13% of all foreigners; numbers which situate them only after the Portuguese. Moroccans, just behind, are more than 460,000 and represent 12.5% of all the foreigners. In third place, out of the Maghreb nationals, come Tunisians, with nearly 150,000 nationals in France. Therefore, this country would be Tunisians main destination, even above Italy.

However, the “nationality” criterion underestimates the members of the Maghrebi community living in France as a part of the immigrants –and their descendants– are now French. Indeed, flows between these countries and France are more than half a century old, and these three countries moreover were French colonies (except for the north of Morocco) so historical links are very strong. It is therefore interesting to analyse data by place of birth. In that case, Algerians would multiply by three. However, it should be also taken into account that “pied noirs” with a European origin are included. Tunisians also more than double their numbers and Moroccans increase significantly. Therefore, there would be a total of 2.5 million people born in Maghreb living in France. Numbers would increase even more if descendants were to be added.

If we abandon stock sources and analyse recent migrations from and to these three European countries, the first aspect which should be underlined is that flow sources are more limited than stock ones, particularly in France and Italy, and especially on exits.

Moreover, as national statistical organisations have many difficulties in measuring these moves, a part of which are carried out by irregular migrants, published figures are not fully reliable. Table 2 shows available data in these three EU countries on immigrant, emigrant and net migrant flows by Moroccans, Algerians and Tunisians, and flows which have the three Maghreb countries as either origin or destination points. We should, however, once more stress that these data can be only interpreted as approximations to the real flows' volume. Data really reflect more the source's coverage degree than the real magnitude of flows.

Table 2. Immigrants, emigrants and net migrants in Spain, France and Italy with Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian nationality, or with previous/following residence in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. Most recent available data.

	Immigrants					
	Spain		France		Italy	
	Nationality	previous resid.	Nationality	previous resid.	Nationality	previous resid.
Algeria	8,007	6,338	28,454	-	-	1,202
Morocco	84,978	71,916	24,054	-	-	21,603
Tunisia	314	265	10,345	-	-	4,879
Foreign	920,534	958,266	182,390	-	-	304,960
Total	958,266		182,390		304,960	
	Emigrants					
	Spain		France		Italy	
	Nationality	next resid.	Nationality	next resid.	Nationality	next resid.
Algeria	3,266	326	-	-	-	128
Morocco	31,568	3,138	-	-	-	671
Tunisia	156	21	-	-	-	380
Foreign	198,974	227,065	-	-	-	53,931
Total	227,065		-		53,931	
	Net migrants					
	Spain		France		Italy	
	Nationality	prev/next resid.	Nationality	prev/next resid.	Nationality	prev/next resid.
Algeria	4,741	6,012	-	-	-	1,074
Morocco	53,410	68,778	-	-	-	20,932
Tunisia	158	244	-	-	-	4,499
Foreign	721,560	731,201	-	-	-	251,029
Total	731,201		-		251,029	

Source: Eurostat migration data - 2007 data for Spain and Italy (only total emigrants), 2006 data for France (immigrants by country of nationality), 2005 data for Italy (country of previous/following place of residence).

Tacking this into account, Spain is the country where sources on this issue are more complete, as the *Estadística de Variaciones Residenciales* (EVR) gives data on exit and entry flows by nationality, and by previous and following country of residence. In any case, the idea that Spain is, out of the three, the country with a higher number of recent entries and exits, particularly of Moroccans or flows from and to Morocco,

should be credible. More specifically, in 2007, these nearly meant 10% of all foreigners' entries; 7.5% of all the entries from a foreign country, and 16% of foreigners' exits. However, only 1.4% of the registered emigrants stated that they were emigrating to Morocco. Given Spain's role as a gateway to the EU, this could mean that they are migrating to third countries, probably EU countries –particularly France and Italy. Nevertheless, they could also be going back to their country of origin and Spanish statistics would not have registered it –unlike emigrants' nationality, obtained when migrants get deleted from the Spanish municipal register when their registration expires.

Numbers of Algerians and Tunisians registered in Spain are, in comparison, much smaller, as they do not reach 1%. In any case, as the three nationalities have many more entries than exists, migration balances are widely positive (from the reception country's point of view). In 2007, specifically, there was a positive migratory growth of between 60,000 and 75,000 new Maghrebi citizens in Spain, representing between 7% and 9% of the approximately 730,000 new inhabitants that Spain won by migratory growth. As Fargues (2009: 270-271) argues, and these data confirm, emigration from Arab countries, and particularly from Morocco, is presently really increasing and will probably continue to do even more so in the near future, due to a combination of internal (expulsion) and external (attraction) factors.

This phenomenon is more difficult to analyse in France and Italy, as the former only gives immigration data by nationality –showing that Algerian immigration is slightly more numerous than Moroccan one, and much more than Tunisian one. Italy, on its side, gives both entry and exit data, but it only gives them by country of origin and destination, not by nationality. Italian information on flows reinforces stock data by suggesting that the main origin and destination points are Morocco, followed by Tunisia. Flows from and to Algeria are negligible, due to their scarce volume. Data also show that migratory flows between Maghreb and Italy are much smaller than those to or from Spain, and, if we only take immigration into consideration, than those to France.


3. Births, population growth and age structure in both Mediterranean shores

3.1. Fertility change and demographic structures

The six Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries have increased in a similar amount of people since the 1960s. The three Northern ones have added 40 million new residents to the 126 million they already had in 1960, and therefore they

now have 166 million people; while the three Southern countries, on the other hand, have added 48.5 million inhabitants to the scarce 26.5 million they already had in 1960, which means they now have 75 million residents. Therefore population volume differences between the two areas have been reduced in 8 million people, going from 99 million people in favour of the Northern countries in 1960 to 91 million in 2007. That is to say, while Northern Mediterranean countries have grown a 31.7%, Southern ones have increased a 182%. In other words, Southern countries have grown six times faster than Northern Mediterranean ones.


Figure 1. Population growth in the six selected countries between 1960-2007



Source: Eurostat data for Spain and Italy, INSSE data for France and World Population Prospects: The 2008 Population Database for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia.

Despite constant population growth in the six countries, there has also been an important aging process, particularly in Northern countries, due to fertility decline. In 2005, for example, percentages of population under 14 in Northern Mediterranean countries reached their lowest level since 1960: 14.2% for Spain, 14.5% for Italy and 18.4% for France. Values are higher for the latter because fertility decline was not so intense in this country than in the other two. Percentages of young people, those who should incorporate the labour market, on their hand, had reached their maximum level some years before: Spain attained 24.9% in 1990; Italy 23.8% that same year and France 24.1%. Percentages of those above 65 are, however, increasingly important and will reach, in 2010, a proportion of 17% in France and Spain and 20.4% in Italy.

Figure 2. 1960 and 2010 population pyramids for the six selected Mediterranean countries




Source: World Population Prospects: The 2008 Population Database.

In the three Southern Mediterranean countries, on their hand, percentages of children under 14 reached their maximum level in Tunisia (46.3%) in 1965 and in Algeria (48.8%) and Morocco (47.6%) in 1970, doubling Northern country ones. Nevertheless, children's proportions have been decreasing since and have been replaced by young population as the most important age group, reaching a maximum proportion of around 30% in 2005 in the three countries, but it seems to be diminishing since then. Population over 65 is still relatively low, with numbers going from 4.5% in Algeria to 6.7% in Tunisia, but it is constantly, though slowly, growing. Therefore, due to the present population age structure, less young people are incorporating the labour market than in the former generation, for the first time. However, as children under 14 have an increasingly low weight and that of the elderly is still not very high, the relative weight for the working age population is still high, situation called by some authors, we should recall, "demographic opportunity window".

According to several authors, one of the variables explaining the growing attractiveness of North Mediterranean countries for South Mediterranean immigrants is changes in the former's population structure, and particularly the consequences of the arrival of empty cohorts to the labour market bringing a workforce shortage. In fact, the decreasing generation size can be observed by looking at the number of births (figure 3): while Italy and Spain substantially reduced their births, France kept the number of births more or less stable during the last forty five years. The 819,819 French births of 1960 were almost identical to those 819,605 births of 2007, fluctuating, in the mean time, between a maximum of 877,804 births in 1964 and 881,284 in 1971 and a minimum of 720,395 births in 1976 and 711,610 in 1993. Therefore, there were very little variations. The fall in the number of births during the first five years of the 1970s due to the economic crisis, together with a slow recovery from the beginning of the 1990s up to now, would be the two most remarkable events in this period. The other two European countries analysed, follow similar trends, but their changes are more sudden. Italy had a maximum number of 1,035,210 births in 1964 and then figures started first slowly to decrease up to 1974 and then started abruptly falling up to 1998 and attaining minimum values of 515,439 births that year. Numbers are slowly recovering, attaining 575,810 births in 2008. In Spain there was a stable amount of births up to 1974 (688,398 births), then numbers started to drop, reaching a minimum of

362.626 births in 1996. From then on there is a significant increase, attaining 518,967 births in 2008.


Figure 3. Number of births in Spain, France and Italy from 1960 to 2008



Source: Births (children born alive), using Eurostat, INSEE and INE data.


These declining numbers of births are related to an important fall in the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) or number of children per woman of reproductive age (figure 4). Though this indicator has had a similar evolution in the three countries, it fell with a different intensity in each of them. The departure level in the 1960's was 2.31 children per woman in France and 2.35 in Italy. Spain, on its side, had a slightly higher TFR of 2.92 children per woman at the end of that decade. Then, values start to fall even under the replacement level in the latter half of the 1970s in France and Italy, followed by Spain with some delay, about five years later. Minimum values attained by these countries were not the same. While in France the indicator did not fall under 1.71, attaining it at the beginning of the 1990s, in Italy and Spain it reached its floor five years later, with 1.19 and 1.16 children per woman, respectively. From this point on this indicator has slowly started to recover. France presently has a TFR of 1.89, Spain of 1.43 for and Italy of 1.38. TFR falls are associated with an increasing age at which women have their children. In Spain and Italy maximum fertility rates are attained by women aged between 30 and 34, and fertility rates for women aged between 35 and 39 are higher than that for women between 20 and 24. However, in France, maximum rates are attained, by a small difference, among women between 25 and 29 (figure 5).

Figure 4. Total Fertility Rate in the six selected countries between 1960 and 2050



Source: World Population Prospects: The 2008 Population Database.

Figure 5. Current fertility rates by age in the six selected countries



Source: World Population Prospects: The 2008 Population Database.

TFR fell dramatically in the south Mediterranean countries. Initial figures, from the beginning of the 1970s, were particularly high, above seven children per women (see figure 4). Tunisian and Moroccan rates started to fall at the end of the 1960's and

those of Algeria a little later, strongly decreasing until presently reaching 2.38 children per woman in Algeria and Morocco and 1.86 in Tunisia, a rate lower than the French one. Age-specific fertility rates are increasingly similar to those in the northern countries, even though the 20 to 24 age group has still relatively high levels (figure 5). Differences in fertility levels between the six countries are therefore presently relatively small compared to what they had been in the near past, and, according to forecasts, they will tend to reduce even more (see figure 4 again). The last phase of the Demographic Transition in the southern countries (Reher, 2004), and the so called Second Demographic Transition in the northern countries (Van de Kaa, 1994) are the main drivers of the changes observed in the two shores of the Mediterranean.

3.1. Cohort size and the number of migrants


The number of individuals reaching the labour market is basically given by the number of births in the previous years, and foreign population arriving at different moments will be added to these. In other words, new individuals (immigrants) are added to the age cohorts of the receiving country, which will be more numerous or less numerous cohorts according to past fertility (see figure 6).

On January the 1st 2008 there were 4.268 million working age foreigners in Spain, that is to say, 13.4% of the population. The 30-34 age group, born between 1973 and 1977, just before fertility fell, was the group with more Spanish people in it. 766 thousand foreigners (18.5% of this age group population) incorporated to it, and therefore it ended with 4.136 million people. The 25-29 age group figures (2.937 million Spanish people) already start to show the effects of the declining number of births. As 776 thousand foreigners incorporated it, the total age group is finally formed by 3.714 million people, 20.9% of which are foreigners.

Data from the *Popolazione Straniera Residente* has been used for Italy. This source collects information on legal foreigners and, therefore, would partly under-register foreign population, compared to the Spanish *Padrón continuo*. According to the Italian source, there are 2.702 million foreigners in Italy, which mean a 6.9% of the working population. Italian cohorts born between 1963 and 1967 are the more numerous ones. They form, together with 351 thousand foreigners, a 4.915 million people age group. The number of Italians strongly declines in the cohorts born later, as the number of births in Italy increasingly diminished. However, this fall is only partly compensated

by the increasing number of foreigners. The 25-29 age group contains the highest proportion on foreigners (12.8%) as 411 thousand foreigners incorporated to the 3.204 million Italians already forming the group, resulting in 3.615 million people in total. In conclusion, cohorts are increasingly small in Italy due to the strong decline in the number of births and they are not being compensated by the arrival of foreigners.

Figure 6. Working age population living in Spain, France and Italy by age and nationality



Source: January the 1st 2008 INE data for Spain; January the 1st 2008 ISTAT data for Italy and 1999 INSEE census data for France.

As it can be seen by observing Italian and Spanish data, the baby boom in both countries is nearly separated by ten years, due to its delay in Spain. However, even though the fall in Italy is earlier and more intense, the number of foreigners is quite lower. Age groups with more foreigners in Spain coincide with those with more Spanish people. Moreover, foreigners in the two countries are mainly between 25 and 39,

indicating that they are immigrants arrived recently to two countries where foreign immigration is quickly growing, irrespective of the existing differences in age structure.

The French example is similar to the Spanish one: the cohort with more French people, that aged between 35 and 39 in 1999, also has the highest number of foreigners -i.e. 4.024 million French people and 315 thousand foreigners. This is remarkable in a country with few differences in age cohorts' size. Therefore, the analysis of autochthonous working age cohorts and the arrival of immigrants by age in Spain, Italy and France give us the following finding: the arrival of more or less foreign immigrants is not mainly explained by differences in the size of the age cohorts entering the labour market in the destination countries, but by other factors like the effect of economic cycles –which can foster, restrain or revert back migration flows– or the existence of significant differences between departure and destination countries in economic development, human capital formation and labour market performance. Let's analyse these two latter aspects in the following section.

4. Education and labour participation differences between both Mediterranean shores as factors feeding migration flows

4.1. The key role of education and labour participation in a segmented labour market

As authors have demonstrated in several papers (Domingo and Gil Alonso, 2007; Gil Alonso and Domingo, 2008), apart from the existing gap in economic development levels and population structures between both shores of the Mediterranean, the main process explaining the arrival of large numbers of immigrants from less developed countries, Maghreb ones among them, to north Mediterranean countries, is the educational, occupational and therefore social promotion of the local population, young people and women in particular. Flows to each of our three destination countries will be larger or smaller depending on how much education has improved and on young people's and women's labour expectations.

In a highly segmented market, the lower end of the labour scale, the hardest jobs, the worst paid or the less prestigious ones, i.e. those jobs which the local people do not want to carry out any more, are generally occupied by immigrants, as well as those jobs linked to reproductive work (domestic service and care for children, elderly and disabled people) which were done before by local women, particularly in countries

where social services are less developed and where there is a strong traditional division of gender roles, like Spain or Italy (King and Zontini, 2000; Parella, 2003). As autochthonous women presently have, particularly younger generations, a much higher education level than former cohorts and sometimes also even higher than that of men of the same age, large numbers of them are incorporating the labour market. Therefore, a new labour demand to carry out reproductive work no longer done by local women, is being generated and mainly covered by immigrant women. The two basic processes involved in creating this mechanism of both (local population) promotion and (recently arrived foreigner) segregation have been: 1) female education improvement in receiving countries, particularly in Spain and Italy, as French women already had a higher level, and 2) the existence of a segmented market (Piore, 1979) in which local and immigrant workers have occupied different labour niches –the best jobs for the former and the worst for the latter– except for a few sectors in which both groups of workers have been competing. In the following sections these two issues will be analysed in greater detail, so that the reason why educational and labour factors, and not purely demographic ones, are behind migratory flows between the two Mediterranean shores can be better understood.


4.2. The education gap as a pull and push factor in trans-Mediterranean flows.

Authors consider (Domingo and Gil Alonso, 2007) that local population educational and labour promotion and foreign immigration have been “complementary” processes. This does not mean that this has been equally positive for both populations but that the two processes feed back each other in such a way that the magnitude and importance of one could not be explained without the other. Indeed, a “vacuum cleaner” effect, created by education and labour improvements in receiving countries, particularly in women, is attracting immigrants to those jobs that autochthonous population are not able, or do not want to cover. At the same time, the arrival of these immigrants to the base of the labour pyramid pushes local workers upwards.

Comparing, low medium and high education levels attained by the diverse Spanish, French and Italian female cohorts who were between 25 and 29 and between 55 and 64 in the first quarter of 2009 using Eurostat *European Union Labour Force Survey* data, figure 7 allows observing how education levels improved in these three counties. To put this data into perspective, male figures for the same cohorts have been introduced in an inner circle.

- Though older female generations had a lower education level than their generation males, young women in all three countries have surpassed young men. All three not only present higher percentages of women with high education but also lower proportions of females with low education.

Figure 7. Change in education level (age cohort 25-29 vs 55-64) in Spain, France and Italy, 2009.



Source: Eurostat EU-LFS data (1st quarter 2009)

- French both male and female elderly and younger generations have the best education level.

- Spanish elderly cohorts, particularly female ones, have, on the contrary, the worst, as 3 out of 4 of women has only attained low education. However, young generations, particularly female ones, present high levels of higher education, just slightly under French ones, proving therefore that the country's education levels have largely increased.
- Italian human capital, unlike the Spanish one, has not improved much and therefore differences between the more elderly and the younger cohorts are smaller. However, it should also be taken into account that its percentages of low education are lower than those in Spain, as only higher education proportions have particularly varied in this country.

Summarising, the education level of the three northern shore countries has greatly advanced, particularly among women. While France had the highest departure and global level; Spain has made the biggest progress and Italy significant though minor improvements. As it will be seen later on, this is linked to female labour market participation increase.

However, even though young Maghreb cohorts have significantly increased their education levels, low educated people continue predominating there. Illiteracy levels inherited from the past, on their side, are, particularly for women and people in an unfavourable socio-economic situation, still high (Fergany, 2009: 131). Despite efforts to increase education levels in Arab countries in general, this is generally true throughout this area and levels of education and access to knowledge achieved by other developing regions like the Far East or Latin America have not been attained (Al-Sayyid, 2009: 26). The main indicators collected by the United Nations Statistics Division in the *Demographic Yearbook* for the three countries analysed are shown in the following paragraphs.

- Illiteracy in Algeria has strongly been reduced, particularly in women. While 43% of the women above 10 were literate in 1987 proportions reached 80% in 1998. Therefore, they have even surpassed male (72%) literacy levels. These improvements have particularly involved younger cohorts, as 93% of the women between 20 and 24 are literate, compared to 37% of the women between 65 and 69. However, in 1998, only 14% of the men had finished secondary education and 5% of them had higher education. Women have even lower figures 12% and 4%.

- Moroccans, particularly their women, have even worse figures, as, in 1994, only 33% of the women above 10 were literate (51% in urban areas and only 11% in rural ones) in comparison with 59% of the men. In 2004, figures were slightly better as 45% of the females and 69% of the males were literate. However, there were great differences by cohort: while about half of the women and 3 out of 4 men between 25 and 29 knew how to read and write, only 31% of the men and 5% of the women between 65 and 69 were literate.
- In 2004, literacy levels of Tunisian women were lower (69% of the women above 10 knew how to read and write) than those of men (77%) and slightly lower to Algerian ones. However, as 90% of the women between 20 and 24 are literate compared to only a 15% of those between 60 and 64, there has been significant progress. Even though one third of the men and 21% of the women have finished secondary education, therefore more than in Algeria, percentages having a university degree are even smaller than in the former country and only 6% of the men and 3% of the women have it. Here again, there are important differences by cohort: 34% of the men between 25 and 29 have secondary education, and 10% of them have higher education in comparison with only 4% of the men between 65 and 69 with secondary education and 1% who have higher education. On their hand, 22% of the women between 25 and 29 have secondary education and 5% have a university degree, in comparison to 1% of the women between 65 and 69 who have secondary education and 0.1% who have a university degree.

Therefore, despite recent efforts, results in education are unsatisfactory, particularly among women. Part of the population is not still literate, and the figures of population who have secondary and higher education are still low, even for young generations. Morocco seems to have the worst situation among the countries analysed and Algeria and Tunisia seen to be slightly better.

Education levels of Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian immigrants in Spain, France and Italy are similar to those of the rest of the population in their countries of origin. Table 3 shows that most -between 55% and 78% depending on the nationality-immigrants have low education levels. However, it should be also stated that those with secondary and university degrees are over-represented, possibly because they are the most prepared to leave if they do not find job opportunities in their own country, trying luck in other ones where their preparation might possibly be better valued (Fergany,

2009). High unemployment, under-employment or informal employment rates in young people in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, even affecting those with university degrees and particularly women, are due to a combination of old education systems and inflexible education plans which do not adapt well to the labour market (Yousef and Dyer, 2009), local economies which are unable to generate enough jobs (Vinuesa, 1991) and the arrival of the so called “youth bulge”², born during the deep demographic transition which maintained high fertility levels until the end of the 1980s, to working ages (Fergany, 2009).

Table 3. Percentages of Algerians, Moroccans, and Tunisians living in Spain, France and Italy by education level

		Algerians	Moroccans	Tunisians
SPAIN	Low	68%	78%	47%
	Medium	14%	10%	28%
	High	18%	12%	26%
FRANCE	Low	57%	55%	55%
	Medium	15%	17%	16%
	High	28%	28%	29%
ITALY	Low	60%	77%	77%
	Medium	12%	5%	5%
	High	28%	18%	19%

Source: Informe MED.2008, taking data from CARIM Mediterranean Migration Report 2006-2007.

Note: low education level (ISCED 0-2); medium education level (ISCED 3-4); high education level (ISCED 5-6).

Maghrebi immigrants in France have highest education level and this could maybe due to the fact that some of them have been living there for many years; they arrived when they were children and have been to school there, or they were born there and have therefore been integrated into the French school system. Maghreb immigrants in Italy, except Tunisians, also seem to have a better education level than in Spain, though differences are not that large. In fact, very few Tunisians live in Spain, and some of them probably have a particular profile (are students or senior managers or skill workers). Generally speaking, Moroccan immigrants, and particularly those living in Spain (the majority of Maghrebi immigrants in this country), have the lowest education level out of those analysed, reflecting, therefore, their country’s situation in this field.

² This “youth bulge” where the young working age cohorts represent a good part of the total population, can give place to a “demographic opportunity window”. As the economic dependency ratios are reduced, labour participation increases and there are more savings and internal investment due to the growing size of the working age population, greater per capita growth can be obtained (Williamson and Yousef, 2002). However, this scenario needs an adequate political and institutional background or otherwise youth and total unemployment grows.

Algerian and Tunisian immigrants, on their hand, it is somewhat higher. However, their lowest levels are found among Algerians living in Spain and Tunisians living in Italy.

European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) data for 2008 allows comparing Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian immigrant characteristics with those of the Spanish, French and Italian population, with those of foreigners and with non EU citizens, as well as permitting to observe differences by sex. There is no data for Tunisians living in Spain because very few were included in the sample (table 4).

Table 4. Education level distribution in Spain, France, and Italy, by nationality and sex, 2008 (in percentages)

NATIONALITY	SEX	SPAIN			FRANCE			ITALY		
		Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
National	Males	50.6	21.5	27.9	31.8	44.5	23.6	48.6	39.8	11.6
	Fe males	48.2	21.8	30.0	31.8	40.7	27.5	46.6	39.3	14.0
	Both sexes	49.4	21.7	28.9	31.8	42.6	25.6	47.6	39.6	12.8
Foreing	Males	45.6	35.3	19.1	51.5	29.6	18.9	55.7	36.9	7.5
	Fe males	44.0	36.7	19.3	56.0	22.4	21.6	46.6	40.0	13.4
	Both sexes	44.8	36.0	19.2	53.8	26.0	20.3	51.0	38.5	10.5
Non EU27	Males	53.1	32.4	14.5	50.9	29.7	19.5	62.2	31.1	6.7
	Fe males	49.9	34.2	15.9	59.0	21.6	19.4	54.7	33.1	12.1
	Both sexes	51.5	33.3	15.2	55.0	25.5	19.4	58.6	32.1	9.3
Morocco	Males	76.4	18.1	5.5	56.5	26.9	16.7	72.2	22.0	5.8
	Fe males	78.4	17.7	3.9	73.7	16.4	9.9	75.9	20.3	3.8
	Both sexes	77.2	17.9	4.8	65.1	21.6	13.2	73.7	21.3	5.0
Algeria	Males	67.5	32.5	0.0	58.7	29.0	12.2	61.1	33.5	5.4
	Fe males	45.1	25.1	29.8	74.2	15.8	10.0	60.8	11.9	27.3
	Both sexes	56.6	28.6	14.8	65.2	23.5	11.3	61.0	28.5	10.5
Tunis	Males	-	-	-	47.8	32.7	19.5	73.6	20.2	6.2
	Fe males	-	-	-	59.5	11.2	29.3	70.8	22.8	6.5
	Both sexes	-	-	-	53.4	22.5	24.1	72.8	21.0	6.3

Source: *European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS)*, 2008 annual data.

Note: Education level defined as “highest level of education or training successfully completed” has been simplified as a three level variable HATLEVID to improve comparability: Low - lower secondary (ISCED 0-2); Medium - upper secondary (ISCED 3-4); High - Third level (ISCED 5-6).

Moroccan and Algerian men residing in France always have a better education level than women of these nationalities living in that country. However, this is not always the case for Algerians living in Spain and Italy, as more than a quarter of the women of this nationality living in these countries have a university degree. Though they are small populations which probably have a different profile (students and professionals would be overrepresented) from that of the rest of the Maghreb migrants, it is worth underlining their existence, as this migration could be fed, as we have already explained, by the high educated female unemployment rates in their own countries. Indeed, even though general unemployment rates in Arab countries have diminished in the first five years of the 21st century, female unemployment rates, particularly those of

high educated ones, have increased in many countries, becoming the highest unemployment rates of all (Nabli, Silva-Jauregui and Johansson da Silva, 2009).

Even though Tunisians are, in general, the community with less differences by sex in France, there are more Tunisian women than men with high education. However, it is also true that there are also more women with low education in that country. Therefore, here again, there might be two different immigrant profiles. On the one hand, there would be students and professionals and, on the other, the more voluminous and “traditional” low education type.

As for the comparison between the three nationalities analysed and the local population, all foreigners and non EU citizens, it has also given interesting results. Foreigners in general, particularly non EU citizens, have a lower education level than French, Italian and Spanish nationals, except for women of the latter nationality, as more Spanish women than foreign ones have only attained primary education, but it should also be taken into account that most of them belong to elderly cohorts. However, the main point we would like to underline here is that, despite the above mentioned very specific and not very numerous exceptions of Algerian women in Spain and Italy and Tunisian women in France, both male and female immigrants from the Maghreb, but particularly the latter, have a lower education level than non EU citizens and foreigners in general.

Summarising, available information confirms that, both local women and those from the Maghreb have increased their education level, but the former considerably more. Therefore, most immigrant women in Spain, France and Italy and also most of those who continue living in their countries of origin still have a low education level. Despite exceptions, most migrant women confirm the rule that they tend to have a low education levels. Even though Maghreb men are in a better position, their education level is still worse than that of local men and than that of the rest of male immigrants. As percentages of highly qualified migrants of both sexes among Maghreb immigrants, compared to the total volume of immigrants from this area, is relatively small, and in any case smaller than for other world regions (Johansson, 2009: 346) they have disadvantages in trying to climb the labour market ladder in the destination countries.

Though East European and Latin-American immigrants have indeed a better mean education level than North Africans they are also mostly employed in little qualified or

unqualified jobs, and therefore endure a phenomenon called “over-qualification”. However, as we will see in the next section, immigrants from the Maghreb are particularly confined to low category types of jobs due to their low education levels which stop them from reaching higher posts in the labour ladder.

4.3. Foreigner’s labour market participation in France, Italy, and Spain: What is the role of Maghreb immigrants in Southern European labour markets?

Mediterranean Arab counties have some of the world’s highest unemployment rates (Awad, 2009, mentioned in El Ehwany, 2007), and even though they have been decreasing in the three analysed countries during this last decade, they continue being very high, particularly female ones (table 5).

Table 5. 2000 and 2005 unemployment rates (%) by sex in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia

Countries	Females		Males	
	2000	2005	2000	2005
ALGERIA	31.4	21.3	26.6	19.8
MOROCCO	26.7	24.8	19.8	16.3
TUNISIA	15.9	17.2	15.1	12.9

Source: Nabli, Silva-Jáuregui, Johansson de Silva (2009).

Note: data for Morocco are only for urban areas.

Moreover, the highest unemployment rates are found among the best qualified. For example, 28% of those unemployed in Algeria in 2006 were women with a university degree, but only 3% of those without education and 10% of those with primary education were in the same situation that same year (Nabli, Silva-Jáuregui and Johansson de Silva, 2009: 171). This, together with high underemployment levels, low salaries, low education, low employment opportunities, and the political situation would lead young people to see an escape route in emigration (Fergany, 2009). However, as we will see in the following paragraphs, the situation awaiting them in Spain, France and Italy is not much better than the one they are leaving.

EU-LFS annual data for 2008 have been used in the rest of the chapter. Table 6 allows seeing how have Algerians, Tunisians and Moroccans integrated into the Spanish, Italian and French labour markets. While immigrant men from the analysed countries have similar or even higher participation rates than local male workers and other foreigners (except for Moroccan men living in Spain who have exceptionally low rates) women tend to have very low activity rates; much lower than local women and, of

course, than other foreign women, who have the highest participation rates in Italy and Spain.

Table 6. Labour participation, employment and unemployment rates in Spain, France and Italy, by nationality and sex. 2008

NATIONALITY	SEX	SPAIN			FRANCE			ITALY		
		Empl. rate	Unempl. rate	Activ. rate	Empl. rate	Unempl. rate	Activ. rate	Empl. rate	Unempl. rate	Activ. rate
National	Males	73.5	8.9	80.7	70.5	6.6	75.5	69.5	5.6	73.6
	Females	54.3	12.2	61.8	61.7	8.1	67.1	46.8	8.3	51.0
	Both sexes	64.0	10.3	71.4	66.1	7.3	71.3	58.1	6.7	62.3
Foreing	Males	72.3	17.0	87.1	66.2	13.3	76.4	81.9	6.0	87.1
	Females	57.0	18.0	69.5	46.9	14.4	54.8	52.8	11.9	59.9
	Both sexes	64.5	17.5	78.2	56.4	13.7	65.4	67.1	8.5	73.3
Non EU27	Males	71.0	18.5	87.1	59.8	18.6	73.4	81.5	6.4	87.2
	Females	58.3	18.7	71.7	39.3	21.0	49.7	49.8	12.7	57.1
	Both sexes	64.5	18.6	79.2	49.3	19.6	61.3	66.2	8.8	72.6
Algeria	Males	57.7	21.8	73.9	59.5	21.4	75.7	79.2	11.5	89.5
	Females	30.1	0.0	30.1	26.9	25.0	35.9	0.0	100.0	19.1
	Both sexes	45.5	26.5	61.8	45.8	22.3	59.0	60.9	16.8	73.2
Morocco	Males	66.0	25.1	88.2	51.3	20.9	64.9	79.3	7.8	86.0
	Females	26.1	34.2	39.7	29.4	25.8	39.6	27.8	21.7	35.5
	Both sexes	49.9	27.2	68.5	40.3	22.7	52.2	59.1	10.7	66.2
Tunis	Males	-	-	-	60.1	18.1	73.3	76.3	13.1	87.8
	Females	-	-	-	31.9	26.3	43.3	24.4	19.7	30.4
	Both sexes	-	-	-	46.7	21.0	59.1	60.5	14.0	70.3

Source: European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 2008 annual data.

Moroccan women in Spain and France, and Tunisian women in the latter have the highest participation rates, around 40%, while Maghreb women living in Italy have the lowest ones. Therefore, employment rates among them are also very low. For example, Algerian women in Spain and Tunisian women in France would be around 30%. Their men, on their side, would have higher employment rates. However, even though their activity rates were similar to those of local men, their employment rates are visibly lower, even lower than those of other foreigners in general, and than those of non EU citizens. Italy would be the exception, as Tunisians, Moroccans and Algerians have even higher employment rates than Italians themselves, even though not higher all foreigners together. However, the situation in Spain and France is worse for them, as only between one half and three quarters of Maghreb immigrants living there are employed. This obviously translates into very high unemployment rates, much more than those of local men and all migrants. This is presently even more so if we keep in mind that LFS from 2008 data did not yet fully take into account the present global economic crisis.

As female unemployment rates are higher than male ones, Moroccans have higher rates than the rest of nationalities, and Spain has the highest rates among the destination countries, it is not strange to observe that Moroccan women living in Spain are the

group with the highest unemployment rates, i.e. 34%³. Unemployment rates in France are also very high, always above 21%. However Italian ones are relatively lower, particularly among men (7.8% for Moroccans, 11.5% for Algerians), though they are always much higher than those of Italians, all foreigners together and the non EU citizens.

Summarising, Maghreb immigrants living in Spain, France and Italy have, in comparison other immigrants, low female labour market integration, lower employment rates and much higher unemployment ones. Here again, women are in a worse position. Moroccans seem to have a slightly worse situation than the other two nationalities and Spain, the country where they have more relative weight, has the highest unemployment rates. Italy, on its side, has the highest (though only male) employment rates and the lowest unemployment ones.

As we have observed, Maghreb immigrants are not well integrated in Spanish Italian or French labour markets. However, the analysis by sector is even worse, as can be observed in Table 7. This table combines the three Maghrebi nationalities together as sub-samples become too small and no longer representative or results cannot simply be given by Eurostat because they go beyond confidentiality limits when the sample is reduced to those employed and it is further de-composed by nationality, activity sector and sex. As we have been able to observe in the former tables, Tunisians, Moroccans and Algerians have similar labour characteristics and they are quite different from those of other immigrants, therefore we consider that we have not lost any basic information by carrying out this aggregation. However, even then, some cells continue to be blank.

Generally speaking, immigrants from the Maghreb are under-represented in the sectors with highest salaries like the public services (education, health) and the public sector. Their absence from the latter is relatively logical as some of its posts are reserved for nationals. However, Maghreb immigrants are over-represented in the hardest, more unstable, less prestigious, and worst paid jobs.

In other words, men are particularly working in the construction, the industrial sector, and in the low capital intensive but high labour intensive service sector such as in hotels, restaurants, or trade. However, there are also specificities of the destination

³ In Italy Algerian women have 100% unemployment, but this is due to the sample's small numbers and therefore it is not representative. In Spain, on the contrary, Algerian women have a neither representative nor credible 0%.

countries, like the weight of construction in the Spanish economy or industry in the Italian one, which should be also taken into account. Although Maghreb immigrants share these characteristics with other immigrants, particularly non EU citizens, their excessive weight in the construction and industrial sectors in France and Italy or, as Cohen (1995: 293) already underlined more than a decade ago, in the Spanish agricultural sector, would maybe indicate that they are in an inferior position than other immigrants.

Table7. Percentage of employed in Spain, France and Italy by activity sector, nationality and sex. 2008

COUNTRY	ACTIVITY SECTOR	National workers		Foreing workers		Non EU27 citizens		Maghreb countries	
		Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
SPAIN	Agriculture and fishing	4.9	2.6	8.8	2.9	8.8	2.6	19.7	0.0
	Construction	16.6	1.9	35.1	0.9	35.7	0.6	35.5	0.0
	Public admin., education and health	13.8	29.5	2.2	6.6	1.2	4.9	0.7	3.7
	Industry, transport and mining	29.3	13.6	22.0	8.2	21.1	6.2	20.3	14.4
	Financial and real estate	12.1	16.2	6.5	13.1	5.2	13.1	1.4	15.6
	Hotels, rest. and whol. and retail trade	19.5	26.7	20.1	32.6	22.6	32.5	21.0	30.3
	Private home and personal services	3.8	9.6	5.3	35.6	5.3	40.0	1.3	36.1
FRANCE	Agriculture and fishing	3.8	1.8	2.9	0.9	2.8	1.8	5.1	0.0
	Construction	11.3	1.3	31.6	1.5	25.8	0.0	28.7	0.0
	Public admin., education and health	18.9	41.9	4.1	20.7	3.8	21.0	0.0	18.9
	Industry, transport and mining	30.1	13.0	18.8	9.3	20.0	9.7	23.3	2.1
	Financial and real estate	13.5	13.7	15.7	20.3	13.4	20.2	12.6	38.5
	Hotels, rest. and whol. and retail trade	16.3	16.9	21.5	21.7	26.5	28.6	28.4	27.2
	Private home and personal services	4.1	8.9	3.5	22.5	5.2	14.9	1.9	8.7
ITALY	Agriculture and fishing	4.2	2.9	4.6	1.4	4.6	1.0	5.8	0.0
	Construction	12.2	1.2	27.0	0.5	22.8	0.6	24.7	0.0
	Public admin., education and health	14.5	32.1	1.1	9.9	0.8	8.7	0.0	4.2
	Industry, transport and mining	32.6	18.5	36.8	14.0	37.6	13.7	42.3	23.3
	Financial and real estate	13.4	15.9	6.7	10.1	7.3	9.5	5.0	14.8
	Hotels, rest. and whol. and retail trade	19.3	21.6	17.1	19.7	19.2	18.9	19.1	22.6
	Private home and personal services	3.8	7.8	6.7	44.3	7.7	47.7	3.1	35.1

Source: European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 2008 annual data.

Note: Economic activity sectors have been built according to the NACE classification rev.1.1.

Women, on their side, follow the same general trend, though differences in the main sector's position between Spain and Italy, on one side, and France, on the other, can also be observed. More than a third Maghreb female immigrants working in Spain and Italy do it in the domestic service while hotels, the trade sector, industry, and the financial-real estate sector would be, at a great distance, the next main employers. In France, however, the latter would however be the main sector followed by hotels, restaurants and trade, public administration, education and health. Domestic service, on its side, would be relatively small here. This significant difference would be due to the

longer presence of this community in France. This would have helped these women to integrate in the French labour market in general and to attain certain sectors in particular like public administration, education, and health which in Spain and Italy are basically reserved to local women. However, it should be reminded that only a very low percentage of them is economically active.

Nevertheless, being less concentrated in a particular sector does not necessarily mean that they occupy better posts in the labour scale⁴. Therefore, the following step has been to analyse the distribution of occupations by nationalities (table 8). Results are concluding. Maghreb immigrant men basically work, in the three countries, in elementary occupations, or as artisans. In Spain they also work in trade and in Italy and France as plant and machine operators. However, very few of them work as managers, professionals, clerks or technicians and as researchers, even though foreigners as a whole have a certain weight in these jobs, and obviously, local workers.

Segregation is even stronger among women as they are concentrated in only two types of jobs: elementary occupations, occupying, by far, the first position in the three countries, and trade. Yet, here again certain differences between countries should be underlined. Due to the weight of the manufacturing sector in the Italian economy, more of these women work as artisans or plant and machine operators than in other countries. The higher number of professional women from this origin working as clerks in France it would be maybe due to their long presence in this country.

However, they are only exceptions to the rule as Maghreb workers usually occupy low category jobs in sectors like domestic service, intensive agriculture, construction or tourism, with a considerable amount of insecure, precarious or/and temporary, low skilled and badly paid jobs. As we saw in the last section, these high numbers of these workers in elementary occupations has to do without doubt with their low mean education level, particularly in women. Many of them do not even enter the labour market or present very high unemployment rates. Moreover, Maghreb immigrants in general endure really bad security and labour conditions in their work, live in places in bad conditions and suffer discrimination (Awad, 2009). Even though they are factors difficult to measure, they also affect the (lack of) integration in the destination countries.

⁴ NACE classification indicates the economic sector to which the company employing the worker belongs but not the post he or she occupies in it.

Table 8. Percentage of employed by occupational status in Spain, France and Italy, by nationality and sex. 2008

COUNTRY	ACTIVITY SECTOR	National workers		Foreing workers		Non EU27 citizens		Maghreb countries	
		Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
SPAIN	Clerks	5.9	15.6	1.9	7.1	1.6	6.2	0.0	0.0
	Craft and related trade workers	23.9	2.2	36.4	1.6	36.9	1.4	34.4	0.0
	Elementary occupations	8.6	14.7	22.7	47.9	26.8	52.7	38.2	66.4
	Legislators, senior officers and managers	9.7	6.6	5.1	3.2	3.4	2.6	3.5	0.0
	Plant and machine operators	14.3	3.0	10.6	2.2	10.5	1.6	9.0	0.0
	Professionals	10.6	18.5	4.0	4.2	1.8	2.2	0.0	0.0
	Service workers and shop and sales workers	9.6	22.8	10.6	29.3	11.2	30.9	10.8	33.6
	Skilled agriculture/fishery workers	3.4	1.5	2.4	0.0	2.1	0.0	4.2	0.0
	Technicians and assoc. professionals	13.4	15.0	6.0	4.5	5.2	2.4	0.0	0.0
FRANCE	Clerks	5.9	19.5	3.5	8.4	2.5	9.3	1.6	9.5
	Craft and related trade workers	19.3	2.1	36.8	2.3	31.0	2.3	34.6	0.0
	Elementary occupations	6.1	12.6	9.0	39.3	12.8	36.3	13.1	52.4
	Legislators, senior officers and managers	9.9	6.9	10.3	5.9	9.9	6.0	9.6	0.0
	Plant and machine operators	13.5	3.1	13.4	3.8	16.7	4.6	19.2	0.0
	Professionals	13.3	12.3	10.2	8.9	9.2	8.0	6.2	8.4
	Service workers and shop and sales workers	6.5	19.9	6.8	19.4	9.7	23.3	9.9	29.7
	Skilled agriculture/fishery workers	4.4	1.7	2.9	1.5	2.5	1.3	4.3	0.0
	Technicians and assoc. professionals	18.3	21.1	7.0	10.4	5.8	9.0	1.5	0.0
ITALY	Clerks	8.1	18.6	3.4	3.4	3.4	2.4	3.5	1.3
	Craft and related trade workers	22.3	5.4	41.4	8.0	38.1	7.9	40.3	17.9
	Elementary occupations	7.1	8.2	21.9	48.9	24.9	53.1	27.0	41.4
	Legislators, senior officers and managers	9.2	6.9	3.3	3.0	3.5	3.2	1.1	2.0
	Plant and machine operators	11.3	3.8	16.3	5.2	17.0	6.1	18.3	7.6
	Professionals	9.8	12.6	1.5	2.5	0.8	1.2	0.0	0.0
	Service workers and shop and sales workers	8.3	16.1	6.4	21.5	7.2	21.4	4.9	28.0
	Skilled agriculture/fishery workers	2.5	1.3	2.8	0.4	2.5	0.3	2.4	0.0
	Technicians and assoc. professionals	19.6	27.0	3.0	7.2	2.5	4.5	2.5	1.8

Source: European Union Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS), 2008 annual data.

Note: Occupations are based on the ISCO 88 classification.

Given the great weight of sectors with unstable jobs in the Spanish, immigrants in the worst situation would be Maghreb workers living in Spain, basically Moroccans, as these workers are particularly present in the most unstable sectors, in the lowest category jobs and in those with the highest unemployment rates. Their situation in Italy seems to be slightly better as they are more present in the manufacturing sector. As this community has been in France and in its labour market much longer they are more present, in less unstable jobs and sectors, although they are still a minority, particularly women.

Conclusions

As Fernández Cordón (2009) indicates, the times of demographic bomb have ended. Population aging is now the determinant demographic scenario in both Mediterranean shores. Consequences of fertility on the population structure and

maximum differences between the two western Mediterranean shores in this field will be wiped up in the next fifteen years. This area's future development will continue mostly to depend on whether the productive economy is capable of adapting to ageing and, more specifically, to how number of elderly dependants grows and age cohorts entering the labour market decrease. However, the future will also depend on how wealth is redistributed in these Mediterranean societies, and on how much does human capital, particularly in young female generations, improve. Decreasing Spanish and Italian generations are reaching working age while economic recession is settling in. However, instead of there being an avalanche of immigrants to replace or complete the unborn individuals due to fertility decline, economic recession is reducing the numbers of immigrants entering these two countries (Domingo, Gil and Galizia, 2009).

The comparison among the diverse western Mediterranean countries has lead us to conclude that the demographic consequences of the so called Second Demographic Transition theoretical framework, as well as the role of migrations in the 21st century demographic transformations, should be rethought. In this sense, the Second Demographic Transition theory classical formulation was right in stating that the key element to understanding changes in fertility, marriages and families are the transformations in female cohorts (Van de Kaa, 1987). However, its attempts to explain regional differences did not really reach the right conclusions, as they abused of supposedly weberian interpretations, giving a key role to cultural norms and particularly religious ones (Lesthaeghe, 1991). These changes will not be understood if cultural aspects in general and to the weight of Protestantism or Catholicism in particular become the focus of attention instead of economic trends. The delay in Spanish and Italian fertility decline, compared to the French one, and the record low fertility levels which both these countries finally reached, much lower than those France ever attained, cannot be explained by the fact that the first two are catholic countries and the third a non religious one. Neither can couple formation changes be understood from this perspective. Major determinants have instead been Italian and Spanish young female generation's education increase, their incorporation to the labour market and the pace of economic cycles. We should not forget that part of the 1970s and 1980s "delay" and "intensification" of demographic changes in Italy and Spain were due to economic crisis structural effects, basically huge unemployment levels. We should not commit the same mistake when interpreting the present and future sociodemographic changes in the Maghreb.

Concerning the role of migrations in the 21st century demographic transformations Van de Kaa (1991) himself warned that migrations were ignored when building the Second Demographic Transition theory, but changes in developed countries since the 1960s cannot be understood without them. Unexpected immigration growth during this century in traditionally emigrant Mediterranean countries like Spain and Italy can only, once again, be explained by focusing women's position and not on the relative labour market shortages due to changes in demographic structure (Domingo and Gil Alonso, 2007). Demographer Anna Cabré calls "Complex reproduction systems" those societies in which immigration is no longer a basic part of demographic growth but a structural endogenous factor in their demographic evolution. And this is exactly what has happened during the first years of the 21st century.

It will not be long before Maghreb countries experience similar changes too. In fact, Spain and Italy received international immigration from the mid 1970s, as Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia are now doing, even though for the moment they are only receiving it because they are being used by Sub-Saharan and Asian migrants to cross to Europe (Khachani, 2006). However, it should not be forgotten that emigration continues to be their main characteristic, as it was for Spain and Italy several decades ago. Moreover, available data has not permitted an exact evaluation of the consequences emigration is having on Maghrebi's population sex and age structure, nor of its impact on their human capital formation. We have however demonstrated that present particularly high unemployment rates among those with the highest education level, especially women, would indicate that these countries economies are scarcely prepared to absorb education improvements and therefore introduces doubts on whether they can really take advantage of the so called "demographic window of opportunity", that is to say, of having high percentages of working age population due to fertility decline and a still scarce aging process. Emigration will paradoxically condemn part of these young Maghreb men and women to have unskilled jobs in the destination countries (Domingo and Bayona, 2009). Even though specific analyses on Maghreb worker's social mobility in the north Mediterranean countries have not been elaborated in this paper, there seems to be a first phase in the migratory process in which workers would descend in the labour scale (Cachón, 2009).

The main lesson to be extracted from North Mediterranean experiences by South Mediterranean countries is not, as it is said, establishing a demographic development model linked to the "modernisation" process for each country, but rather showing the

major role of the economic cycle in intensifying demographic change. Indeed, the pace of sociodemographic transformations in each Maghrebi country will be determined by the economic situation and its impact on the labour market, combined with education level increases in younger cohorts, particularly in women.

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