

Regional disparities in mortality by heart attack: evidence from France*

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Abstract

This paper studies the determinants of the regional disparities in the mortality of patients treated in a hospital for a heart attack in France. These determinants can be some differences in patient characteristics, treatments, hospital characteristics, and local healthcare market structure. We assess their importance with an exhaustive administrative dataset over the 1998-2003 period using a stratified duration model. The raw disparities in the propensity to die within 15 days between the extreme regions reaches 80%. It decreases to 47% after controlling for the patient characteristics and their treatments. In fact, a variance analysis shows that innovative treatments play an important role. Remaining regional disparities are significantly related to the local healthcare market structure. The more patients are locally concentrated in a few large hospitals rather than many small ones, the lower the mortality.

Keywords: spatial health disparities, stratified duration model

JEL code: I11, C41

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1 Introduction

Spatial disparities in health outcomes have become a major concern in France. A driver of these disparities is often thought to be the missallocation of resources caused by a lack of information on local needs. As a consequence, a reform in 1996 decentralized the funding of the healthcare system at the regional level. A global budget is now decided nationally before being dispatched between regions. Some public regional agencies allocate the regional budgets between local public and private not-for-profit hospitals after some bargaining.

Importantly, it is not obvious whether changing the regional budgets is likely to have a sizable effect on regional disparities in outcomes. The effect will be significant if supply factors (like hospital capacities or equipments) are distributed unevenly over the territory and these factors affect health outcomes significantly. By contrast, changing regional budgets will have a far smaller effect if health outcomes are mainly the result of demand factors (like the age structure and socio-economic habits). Also, the way regional agencies should allocate their regional budget between hospitals is debatable. It is not clear-cut whether it is more efficient to have a few well-equipped hospitals which concentrate all the patients or many small hospitals which cover well the whole regional territory.

In this paper, we quantify the spatial disparities in the mortality of patients treated in a hospital for an acute myocardial infarction (heart attack). We then assess the importance of demand and supply factors in explaining these disparities.

In the economic literature on health outcomes, most of the papers focus on the effect of supply factors, using demand factors only as controls. In that perspective, regional disparities in outcomes may depend on the local management of patients after their admission in hospitals. This management is related both to the quick admittance of patients in an adequate hospital and the quality of care that they receive. A large literature focuses on the effect of ownership on hospital performance. Many authors compares for-profit and not-for-profit institutions (McClellan and Staiger, 2000; Hansman, 1996; Milcent, 2005). Some others study the change in ownership status (Propper, Burgess and Green, 2004).¹ However, these papers do not assess whether there is some sorting of hospitals depending on their ownership status that could lead to spatial disparities in performances. Also, they do not look much on the effect of treatment quality provided by hospitals on outcomes whereas there is an extensive literature in epidemiology on this issue for heart attack

¹Other papers related to the topic include Newhouse, 1970; Cutler and Horwitz, 1998; Silverman and Skinner, 2001; Sloan et al., 1999; Ho and Hamilton, 2000; Kessler and McClellan, 2002.

(see for instance Jollis et al., 1994). Some spatial disparities in the quality of treatments, possibly related to the local proportions of hospitals in each ownership status, may cause some spatial disparities in outcomes. We will address this kind of issues in our study.

In fact, the international literature on spatial health disparities is still scarce. There are some comparisons between countries in the horizontal equity in health care utilization (see van Doorslaer et al., 1997, 1999, 2000). However, for studies on a given country, space is usually not the main topic and it is rather used as an extra-dimension to construct some instruments. For instance, Geweke, Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) explain the hospital choice with the distance between the place of residence and hospitals. There are a few exceptions like Mobley (2003) who studies the effect of the local healthcare structure on prices, but the emphasis is on healthcare access rather than on health outcome. Milcent (2005) evaluates the effect of space on the mortality of patients admitted in a hospital for a heart attack but only through the distance between the place of residence and the hospital which is found to have a non-significant effect. In fact, it is quite possible that the local healthcare market structure has an effect on the local hospital performances. We may think that local interactions and competition, as well as the local concentration of patients in a few hospitals to benefit from economies of scales, may affect the local outcomes. These issues deserve more attention.

By contrast, the literature on spatial disparities in the fields of economic geography and urban economics has developed a lot in recent years. Some papers try to assess to what extent spatial disparities in wages (Duranton and Monastiriotis, 2004; Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2008) or unemployment (Gobillon, Magnac and Selod, 2007) can be explained with workers' composition effects, firm effects and true location effects. We will borrow some tools from this literature as the setting is quite similar.

For our study, we construct a unique matched patients-hospitals dataset from some exhaustive French administrative records over the 1998-2003 period. This original dataset contains some information on the demographic characteristics of patients, their diagnoses and their treatments. It also provides some details on the hospitals where the patients are treated like the location, the ownership status and the capacity. We show that regional disparities in mortality are quite large. In particular, the raw difference in the propensity to die within 15 days between the extreme regions reaches 80%. We then assess whether these spatial disparities come from some local differences in patient characteristics (demographic shifters and secondary diagnoses), treatments, hospital characteristics or healthcare market structure. We first estimate at the patient level a

Cox duration model stratified by hospital (i.e. each hospital has a specific baseline hazard) using the Stratified Partial Likelihood Estimator proposed by Ridder and Tunali (1999). This estimator allows to recover the effect of the patient-specific variables (their characteristics and treatments) while controlling for hospital unobserved heterogeneity. We then reconstruct the survival functions of hospitals net of individual effects and average them at the regional level. We find that remaining regional disparities are lower but are still significant. The difference in the propensity to die within 15 days between the extreme regions is now 47%. A variance analysis at the regional level shows that regional differences in innovative treatments play an important role.

We then assess to what extent the remaining regional disparities can be explained with some hospital and geographic characteristics. For that purpose, we first specify the hospital hazards as the product of some hospital fixed effects and a baseline hazard. We show how to recover the hospital fixed effects using some moment conditions. We then regress the hospital fixed effects on some hospital and regional variables. Finally, we average the model at the regional level and conduct a variance analysis. We find that the local concentration of hospital supply plays a significant role. The more patients are concentrated in a few large hospitals rather than many small ones, the lower the mortality. After hospital and geographic variables have been controlled for, some unexplained regional disparities still remain.

In a first section, we present how the French healthcare system deals with patients admitted in a hospital for an acute myocardial infarction. A second section describes our dataset. We then present in a third section some descriptive statistics on the regional disparities in mortality, demand factors and supply factors. The fourth section details the econometric methodology used to identify the causes of the regional disparities in mortality. The fifth section summarizes the results of the model.

2 Heart attack in the French context

2.1 Healthcare organization

In France, there are two types of ownership: public and private. For public hospitals, all infrastructures, equipments and staff belong to the public sector. Investment in public hospitals are financed by public funding. The staff (including doctors and nurses) consists in salaried civil servants. For private hospitals, infrastructures, equipments and staff belong to the private sector. The non-doctor staff is salaried. Part of the doctor staff is salaried and the other part is

self-employed.

The public sector is under a global budget system. Part of the private sector is under the same global budget system. Private hospitals which benefit from this budget are called not-for-profit hospitals (NFP). Every year, the government determines the global budget and chooses how to divide it between regions (see Graph A1 for a map of the French regions). The regional budget is dispatched between NFP and public hospitals through bilateral bargaining between the regional regulator and the directors of hospitals. Since the *Juppé* reform in 1996, the bargaining power of regional regulators has increased significantly and regional local authorities have gained more influence on the regional hospital organization. NFP and public hospitals should grant access to hospital care to every patients. They cannot make any profit. Hospitals in the private sector (excluding NFP) are paid by fee-for-services and can select patients. The selection is usually done to maximize profit taking into account the socio-economic characteristics of patients (like solvability) and their health. These hospitals have no constraint on profits and are called for-profit hospitals (FP).

All these differences suggest that hospitals have different incentives to provide health care to patients depending on their status (public or private) and mode of reimbursement (fee-for-service or global budget). This is particularly true for innovative procedures that are costly. Indeed, for-profit hospitals are financed via a fee-for-service system. Supplies such as stents are reimbursed ex-post in addition to the fee-for-service payment. Doctors have an incentive to perform innovative procedures as they receive additional fees for performing them. By contrast, it is more difficult for public and not-for-profit hospitals to purchase expensive devices as the public budget does not account for costly innovative procedures (catheterization, angioplasty or stent). However, these hospitals still perform some innovative acts (Dormont and Milcent, 2006). In fact, doctors may have some indirect incentives to perform innovative procedures such as improving their reputation or learning by doing.

Individuals do not have the same access to health care depending on the hospital status and the mode of reimbursement. Patients are not charged in public hospitals except for a small out-of-pocket but they incur charges in private hospitals. By contrast, for-profit hospitals fix the price of cattering and procedures, and patients are reimbursed on the basis of public hospital charges only. The difference between the price and reimbursement can be huge. The situation is intermediate in not-for-profit hospitals as they only fix the price of cattering.

2.2 Treatments of heart attack

In this paper, we focus on one single disease. Indeed, evidence shows that the effect of characteristics (sex, age, ...) on mortality is disease-specific (Wray et al., 1997). We selected the Acute Myocardial Infarction (heart attack) for four reasons. First, it belongs to the ischemic-disease group that has been the primary cause of mortality in France, before getting second recently after cancer. Second, mortality from AMI has been widely studied in the literature to assess the quality of hospital care in the US and the UK. This literature can be used for comparison (see Goworisakaran and Town, 2002, for the US, and Propper, Burgess and Green, 2004, for the UK). Third, AMI is a well-defined pathology with only a few re-admission due to its clinical definition. Fourth, mortality from AMI is an event frequent enough to yield some reliable statistical results. We focus only on the stays of patients who arrived at the hospital after a heart-attack crisis. This sample includes people who were told by their doctor to go to the hospital because of a heart problem and those who were transferred from an emergency unit to a cardiac care unit. We leave aside stays in emergency units when patients died or were sent back home. Indeed, the health of patients in emergency units is usually not stabilized and these patients cannot be cured with the usual treatments which are risky and can cause brutal death.

Before patients arrive at the hospital or when they just get in, they may receive thrombolytic drugs. In the hospital, patients can benefit from various treatments and procedures. These include cardiac catheters (denoted as CATH hereafter), percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA), stent and bypass surgery. A catheter is a flexible and thin pipe which is installed in a vein to facilitate injections and drips. It may also be used to clean arteries to improve the blood flow. A bypass surgery reroute, or “bypass”, is a vein or artery collected on the patient’s body and set up to derive blood from coronary arteries to avoid clogged sections. It allows to improve the blood flow and the oxygenation of the heart. The angioplasty and the stent are some alternatives to the bypass to improve the blood flow in clogged arteries. They are used when arteries are too clogged. An angioplasty consists in inflating a balloon in a blockage to create a channel. This procedure is costly as it induces for one stay an increase in costs which ranges from 30% to 60% (Dormont and Milcent, 2002). The stent is a spring-shaped prosthesis which is used as a complement to angioplasty. It is put inside the balloon to keep the artery dilated. The use of one or several stents with an angioplasty significantly improves the results. We are going to study the effect of treatments over the 1998-2003 period. Angioplasties and stents were some innovative treatments around 1998 and have generalized such that they are used at wide scale in 2003. In

particular, the use of angioplasty with stent has increased from 15% in 1998 to 31% in 2003. In this article, the term *stent* will refer to an angioplasty together with one or more stents, the term *angioplasty* will refer to an angioplasty without stent, and the term *catheterism* will refer to a catheterism without angioplasty and stent.

2.3 Spatial features

We now propose a spatial overview of heart attack. First note that patients who experience an AMI and want to be treated in a NFP or a public hospital usually have to go to a hospital within their region of residence. However, some patients are sometimes transferred to a neighbouring hospital in another region. Also, a patient who gets sick in another region may be cured there. Over the 1998-2003 period, the proportion of AMI patients treated within their region of residence is very high at 92.9%. This proportion is slightly lower for for-profit hospitals (91.4%) than for public hospitals (93.1%) and NFP (95.8%). Together with the regional organization of healthcare, these statistics support the fact that regions can be viewed as local healthcare markets for heart attack.

Depending on their residential location, patients do not face the same supply of healthcare as the local composition of hospitals by status and mode of reimbursement varies widely across space. In 1999, the proportion of beds in public hospitals is large in Franche-Comté (in the east) where it reaches 80% and in the west. By contrast, it is only 46% in the PACA region (in the southern *French Riviera*). The proportion of NFP is the highest in some eastern regions at the German border (Alsace and Lorraine) for historical reasons. Conversely, the proportion of beds in for-profit hospitals is larger in the French Riviera where the population is older and richer.

The local ownership composition of bed capacities is closely related to the local ownership composition of hospitals where AMI patients are treated. Graph 1 shows that around Paris and in southern regions, the proportion of patients treated in a for-profit hospital is higher. These regions often provide more innovative treatments than the others, like stents as shown in Graph 2. In fact, the rank correlation between the proportions of stents and AMI patients in for-profit hospitals is .61. When considering NFP hospitals instead of for-profit hospitals, the correlation is still quite high at .44.

[*Insert Graphs 1 and 2*]

We also constructed the probability to die within 15 days (see Graph 3).² This probability is quite low in the Paris region, the east and south-east. It is larger in the west and south-west. There is no obvious relationship between the probability to die and the proportions of stents or for-profit hospitals (rank correlations: $-.09$ and $.14$ respectively). However, south eastern regions which have a large proportion of for-profit hospitals performing innovative treatments also concentrate older people who are more likely to die. Hence, it is necessary to perform an econometric analysis to disentangle the effect of age and more generally from individual attributes (demographic characteristics and secondary diagnosis) from that of hospital composition and treatments.

[Insert Graph 3]

3 The dataset

3.1 Data sources on patients, hospitals and areas

For our study, the primary dataset is the PMSI (*Programme de Médicalisation des Systèmes d'Information*). This dataset provides the records of all patients discharged from any French acute-care hospital over the 1998-2003 period. It is compulsory for hospitals to provide these records on a yearly basis.³ Three nice features of this dataset are that it provides some information at the patient level, it keeps track of hospitals across time, and it is exhaustive both for the public and private sectors.⁴ A limit of the data is that patients cannot be followed across time if they come back again later in the same hospital or if they change hospital.

The dataset contains some basic information on demographic characteristics of patients (age and sex), as well as some very detailed information on diagnoses and treatments. In our analysis, we can thus take into account all secondary coronary diagnoses as well as all techniques used to cure patients. The dataset also provides us with the type of entry (whether the patients come from their residence, another care service in the same hospital or another hospital) as well as the type of exit (death, home return, transfer to another hospital or transfer to another care service).

²See below for more details on how this probability was computed.

³An exception is local hospitals for which it is not compulsory. This does not affect our study since these hospitals do not take care of AMI patients.

⁴It should be mentioned however that only 90% of the private sector was covered in 1998 and 95% in 1999.

We only keep patients whose pathology was coded as an acute myocardial infarction in the tenth international code of disease (ICD-10-CM), i.e. the patients for which the code was I21 or I22. Before 35, heart attacks are often related to a heart disfunction. As a consequence, we restrain our attention to the patients more than 35 following thus the OMS definition. After deleting observations with missing values for the variables used in our study (which are only a very few), we end up with 421,185 stays (in 1,130 hospitals) over the 1998-2003 period.

We match our dataset with the hospital records from the SAE survey (*Statistiques Annuelles des Etablissements de santé*) that was conducted every year over the 1998-2003 period. The SAE survey contains some information on the municipality where each hospital is located, the number of beds (in surgery and in total) and the number of days that beds are occupied (in surgery and in total). The matching rate is very good and reaches 97% of the stays (which corresponds to 408,592 stays in 1,084 hospitals).

The municipality code in the SAE survey also allowed us to match our dataset with some variables at the municipality level coming from other sources. These variables will be used in our estimations as proxies to control for the municipality averages of individual unobserved socio-economic characteristics. Indeed, the literature has shown that there can be some large socio-economic disparities in health outcomes (see for instance Lindeboom and van Doorslear, 2004; Etilé and Milcent, 2006). Our municipality variables include the municipal unemployment rate computed from the 1999 population census, the median household income from the 2000 Income Tax dataset and the existence of a poor area in the municipality (poor areas being defined by a 1997 law). These indicators should (at least partially) capture some spatial differences in lifestyle that can have an impact on the health of patients and their propensity to die from AMI. Also, thanks to the municipality code, we could identify the urban area in which hospitals are located.⁵ We computed the local numbers of beds as a measure of the interactions between hospitals within a given urban area. This variable also captures congestion effects and we will be able to estimate only the effect of interactions net of congestion. We also computed a regional Herfindahl index at the urban area level using the number of patients in hospitals within each urban area. The Herfindahl index measures for a given urban area to what extent patients are equi-distributed between hospitals or

⁵An urban area is defined as an urban center (with more than 5,000 jobs) and the municipalities in its catchment area. There are 359 urban areas in mainland France and they do not cover the whole territory (as some municipalities are excluded and remain rural).

concentrated within a few hospitals.⁶ When constructing urban area variables, we were confronted with a few hospitals in municipalities which do not belong to any areas or to several of them. We thus introduced some dummies for these two cases as controls. As we will use hospital variables which should be time-invariant in our analysis (see Section 4 and 5), all hospital and geographic variables are averaged across years. There are 406,197 stays (in 1,080 hospitals) for which we have all the information on hospital and geographic variables.

We do not have any information on what happened to transferred patients before their transfer. In particular, we do not know how they were treated and how long they have already stayed in a hospital. As a consequence, we restrict our attention to patients who come from their place of residence. We end up with 341,861 stays (in 1,105 hospitals) for which all the information is available on patient variables (and 331,246 stays in 1,060 hospitals for which all the information is available on hospital and geographic variables).

3.2 Preliminary statistics

For each hospital, we then computed a gross survival function for exit to death using the Kaplan-Meier estimator. This estimator treats other exits (home return and transfers) as censored. As we are mostly interested in hospital disparities across regions, we computed the average survival function by region.⁷ Observations were weighted by the number of patients still at risk in the hospitals.⁸ We selected the region with the highest survival function (Alsace), the region with the

⁶The Herfindahl index for an urban area u is $H_u = \sum_{j \in u} \left(\frac{p_j}{p^u}\right)^2$ where j indices the hospitals, p_j is the number of patients in hospital j , and $p^u = \sum_{j \in u} p_j$ is the total number of patients within the urban area u . H_u increases from $\frac{1}{N_u}$ to 1 as the concentration of patients increases, where N_u is the number of hospitals in the urban area u . When $H_u = \frac{1}{N_u}$, the patients are equi-distributed between the N_u hospitals. When $H_u = 1$, they are all treated within one hospital.

⁷We could have directly computed a survival function for each region. However, we believe that the relevant unit at which the treatment of patients takes place is the hospital. Also, our approach at the hospital level parallels the results obtained for the model presented in Section 5.

⁸When the length of stay increases, the number of patients in a given hospital decreases. Above a given length of stay after which there is no patient at risk anymore, it is not possible to estimate the survival function. We then arbitrarily considered that the hospital survival functions remained constant after this length of stay. When we compute the average survival functions by region, this assumption does not have much effect for short/medium length of stays. Indeed, only small hospitals do not have any patients at risk anymore for these lengths of stays. As a consequence, we computed our descriptive statistics only for stays below fifteen days to minimize the effect

lowest survival function (Languedoc-Roussillon), and the Ile-de-France region that corresponds mostly to the Greater Paris Area and is the most densely populated. Graph 4 represents the survival functions of these three regions as well as their confidence intervals (Graph A2 in appendix represents the survival functions for all the regions and Table A1 ranks the regions according to their probability to die within 15 days). It shows that the average survival functions of any two regions are significantly different.

[Insert Graph 4]

Table 1 reports some disparity indices between regions in the probability to die within 1, 5, 10 and 15 days (defined as one minus the Kaplan-Meier). These indices are the max/min ratio, the Gini index and the coefficient of variation. The Gini indices and the coefficients of variation are computed in two stages. First, we compute the average of a given individual variable (for instance, a death dummy) by region. Then, we compute the regional disparity indices for the resulting variable (in our example, the share of deaths in the region), weighting the observations by the number of patients in the region. The max/min ratio shows that regional disparities are significant. Indeed, the difference in the probability to die within 15 days between the Maximum (Languedoc-Roussillon) and the Minimum (Alsace) is 80%. However, more global indices like the Gini index (0.07) and the coefficient of variation (.218) remain quite small and suggest that disparities are not systematic. Interestingly, disparities are a bit larger for the probability of death within 1 day (Max/Min ratio of 94%). This may be due to different behaviours across regions in transfers and home returns at early days of AMI.

The regional disparities may be explained with some spatial disparities in demand factors (demographic shifters and secondary diagnosis) or in supply factors (treatments, characteristics of hospitals and local healthcare market structure). The purpose of the paper is to disentangle these two types of effects. Potential candidates are built from patient and hospital variables aggregated at the regional level. We now present some regional disparity indices for these candidates. We mostly comment the results obtained for the Gini indices as they are global measures of disparities and they are not sensitive to the level of magnitude as the max/min ratio (alternatively, we could also comment the results obtained with the coefficients of variation which are similar). In the sequel, we will say to ease the presentation that disparities are small when the index is inferior to .1, they are moderate for an index from .1 to .2, they are large for an index from .2 to .3, and they are very large for an index above .3.

of our assumption.

We first consider variables related to patients which were averaged at the regional level. We find that there are significant disparities across regions for some demographic variables: more specifically the Gini index is moderate for females aged 35 – 55 (.12) and males who are more than 85 (.11). For diagnoses, disparities are often moderate or large, the Gini index reaching .23 for surgical French DRGs (.23), .15 for the severity index and .13 for a history of vascular diseases and for stroke. Note that the Gini index is most often moderate for diagnoses related to specific behaviours before the heart attack such as obesity (.17), excessive smoking (.16), and alcohol problems (.14). It is smaller for diabetes (.08). For treatments, disparities are often large or very large. The Gini index reaches goes up to .53 for dilatations other than PTCA and .37 for the cabbage or coronary bypass surgery. These two high disparity indices are not surprising as the related treatments are (very) seldomly applied. More usual treatments like angioplasty and stent still have a large Gini index which takes the value .28 and .21, respectively. Disparities are far smaller for the catheter which is a more widespread treatment (.10).

Overall, the Gini indices show that potential explanations of disparities in the propensity to die can be related to the three types of variables: demographic characteristics, diagnoses and treatments. Our econometric analysis will determine which type of explanation has the largest explanatory power.

[*Insert Table 1*]

We then computed regional disparity indices for the hospital and geographic variables used in our regressions. Whereas hospital variables measure capacities and status (public, for-profit and NFP), geographic variables are meant to capture scale economies and local interactions. For a given variable, we constructed its regional average, weighting the observations by the number of patients in the hospitals. The resulting regional average is then used to compute disparity indices at the regional level. Results are reported in Table 2.

As previously, we only comment Gini indices. We begin with hospital variables. There are large disparities across regions in the average size of hospitals measured by the total number of patients (.23) or the number of AMI patients (0.27). Disparities are even larger for the number of beds (.49) and the number of beds in surgery (.47). There disparities point out at some sorting of hospitals according to their size. Finally, disparities are smaller but still large for the hospital status and more specifically for being a for-profit hospitals (.24).

We now comment the results for geographic variables. We observe some very large disparities in the number of beds in in the urban area (Gini index .66). Disparties are also significant for

the Herfindhal index computed at the urban area level (.20). Finally, regional disparities in municipality variables used as proxies for unobserved demand factors are at best moderate, the Gini index reaching .17 for the presence of a poor area in the municipality.

[Insert Table 2]

Overall, demand and supply factors both constitute potential candidate to explain the regional disparities in mortality. We now present our empirical methodology to disentangle their effects.

4 Econometric method

We first give a brief description of the econometric model before turning to a more formal presentation of our approach. Even if we are interested in studying differences in mortality across regions, we build our model around hospital units. Indeed, hospitals have some specific behaviour and efficiency which should be properly accounted for to avoid misspecification biases. Hence, we use a Cox duration model at the patient level stratified by hospital. This model contains some patient-specific explanatory variables (demographic shifters, diagnoses and treatments), as well as a specific survival function for each hospital which is left unspecified. Ridder and Tunali (1999) explain how to estimate this model using the stratified partial likelihood estimator (SPLE) and establish the theoretical properties of the estimators. Lindeboom and Kerkhofs (2000) apply their methodology to quantify the effect of school on job sickness of teachers and Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2007) use it to analyze the effect of location on finding a job in the Paris region. This methodology is more general than the ones usually used in the health literature on mortality which take into account the hospital unobserved heterogeneity at best with hospital fixed effects (Milcent, 2005). It can be applied even when the sample size and the number of hospitals are large as in our case, whereas it is not even computationally possible to estimate directly some hospital fixed effects. After estimating the hospital survival functions, we average them at the regional level to study the regional disparities in mortality net of the effect of patient-specific variables. We then link the remaining regional disparities to some local differences in hospital and geographic characteristics. For that purpose, we make the additional assumption that the hospital hazards write multiplicatively as the product of a hospital fixed effect and a baseline hazard. We show how to estimate the hospital fixed effects using empirical moment conditions. We then explain these fixed effects with hospital and geographic variables and finally average the model at the regional

level to perform a regional variance analysis.⁹

We now present our approach more formally. For each patient, we observe the length of stay in the hospital and the type of exit (death, home return or transfer). In the sequel, we only study exit to death. All other exits are treated as censored. We specify the hazard function of a patient i in a hospital j (i) as:

$$\lambda(t|X_i, j(i)) = \theta_{j(i)}(t) \exp(X_i\beta) \quad (1)$$

where $\theta_j(\cdot)$ is the instantaneous hazard function for hospital j , X_i are the patient-specific explanatory variables and β are their effect on death. Insofar, the hospital hazards are left completely unspecified and allow for a very general study of regional disparities in death using regional averages. Also, this semi-parametric approach avoids biases on the estimator of coefficients β which could arise from a misspecification of the hospital hazards. The model is estimated by stratified partial maximum likelihood. The contribution to likelihood of a patient i who dies after a duration t_i is his probability to die *conditionally on someone at risk in his hospital dying after this duration*. It writes:

$$P_i = \frac{\exp(X_i\beta)}{\sum_{i \in \Omega_j(t_i)} \exp(X_i\beta)} \quad (2)$$

where $\Omega_j(t_i)$ is the set of patients at risk at day t_i in hospital j , i.e. the set of patients that are still in hospital j after staying there for t_i days. The partial likelihood to be maximized then writes: $L = \prod_i P_i$. Denote $\hat{\beta}$, the estimated coefficients of patient-specific explanatory variables. It is possible to compute the integrated hazard function $\Theta_j(t)$ of any hospital j using the Breslow (1974)'s estimator. It writes:

$$\hat{\Theta}_j(t) = \int_0^t \frac{I(N_j(s) > 0)}{\sum_{i \in \Omega_j(s)} \exp(X_i\hat{\beta})} dN_j(s) \quad (3)$$

where $I(\cdot)$ is the indicator function, $N_j(s) = \text{card } \Omega_j(s)$, and $dN_j(s)$ is the number of patients exiting from hospital j between the days s and $s+1$. From the Breslow's estimator, we compute a survival function for each hospital j as $\exp(-\hat{\Theta}_j(t))$ (an estimator of its standard error is recovered

⁹A tempting alternative approach is to estimate all the coefficients in one stage only introducing all the patient, hospital and geographic variables in a simple Cox model. However, such an approach does not take into account the hospital unobserved heterogeneity. Consequently, standard errors of the coefficients may be highly biased (see Moulton, 1990). Our approach properly accounts for this issue.

using the delta method). The hospital survival functions will be averaged at the regional level to study regional disparities in mortality after any number of days.

We then study the determinants of hospital disparities by specifying the hospital hazard rates in a multiplicative way:

$$\theta_j(t) = \alpha_j \theta(t) \quad (4)$$

where α_j is a hospital fixed effect and $\theta(t)$ is a baseline hazard common to all hospitals. We show in appendix how to estimate the parameters using empirical moments derived from (4).¹⁰ Note that we need an identifying restriction since α_j and $\theta(t)$ can be identified separately only up to a multiplicative constant. We impose for convenience that: $\frac{1}{N} \sum_t N_t \theta(t) = 1$ where N_t is the number of patients still at risk at the beginning of day t and $N = \sum_t N_t$. After some calculations (see appendix), we get:

$$\theta(t) = \left(\frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{j,t} N^j N_t \theta_j(t) \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_j N^j \theta_j(t) \right) \quad (5)$$

$$\alpha_j = \left(\frac{1}{N^j} \sum_t N_{jt} \theta(t) \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{N^j} \sum_t N_{jt} \theta_j(t) \right) \quad (6)$$

where N_{jt} is the number of patients at risk at time t in hospital j , $N^j = \sum_t N_{jt}$, and the sum on t , \sum_t , goes from $t = 1$ to $t = T$ (here, we fix $T = 30$ for convenience). It is possible to obtain some estimators of $\theta(t)$ and α_j replacing $\theta_j(t)$ by the estimator $\hat{\theta}_j(t) = \hat{\Theta}_j(t) - \hat{\Theta}_j(t-1)$ in the right-hand side of equations (5) and (6). These estimators are denoted $\hat{\theta}(t)$ and $\hat{\alpha}_j$. We show in appendix

¹⁰In doing so, we depart from the log-linear estimation method proposed by Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2007). Our approach is more adequate when exits are scarce as in our case. Indeed, Gobillon, Magnac and Selod split the timeline into K intervals denoted $[t_{k-1}, t_k]$. Introduce $\theta_k = \int_{t_{k-1}}^{t_k} \theta(t) dt / (t_k - t_{k-1})$ and $y_{jk} = [\Theta_j(t_k) - \Theta_j(t_{k-1})] / (t_k - t_{k-1})$. Integrating (4) over each interval and taking the log, they get: $\ln y_{jk} = \ln \alpha_j + \ln \theta_k$. y_{jk} is not observed but can be replaced with a consistent estimator: $\hat{y}_{jk} = [\hat{\Theta}_j(t_k) - \hat{\Theta}_j(t_{k-1})] / (t_k - t_{k-1})$. The equation to estimate is then: $\ln \hat{y}_{jk} = \ln \alpha_j + \ln \theta_k + \psi_{jk}$ where $\psi_{jk} = \ln \hat{y}_{jk} - \ln y_{jk}$ is the sampling error. This equation can be estimated with standard linear panel methods. The authors use weighted least square where the weights are the number of individuals at risk at the beginning of the interval. A limit of this method is that $\ln y_{jk}$ can be replaced by its estimator $\ln \hat{y}_{jk}$ only if $\hat{y}_{jk} \neq 0$. When it is not the case, observations should be dropped from the sample. When implementing this approach to our case, this could be an issue as exits are scarce and a significant number of observations should be dropped when the time spent in the hospitals gets large. In practice however, the results obtained with the two approaches are quite similar.

how to compute the covariance matrices of $\hat{\theta} = \left(\hat{\theta}(1), \dots, \hat{\theta}(T)\right)'$ and $\hat{\alpha} = (\hat{\alpha}_1, \dots, \hat{\alpha}_J)'$. We then try to explain the hospital fixed effects with some hospital and geographic variables denoted Z_j . We specify: $\alpha_j = \exp(Z_j\gamma + \eta_j)$ where γ are the coefficients of hospital and geographic variables, and η_j includes some unobserved hospital and geographic effects. For a given hospital j , taking the log and replacing the hospital fixed effect with its estimator, we get:

$$\ln \hat{\alpha}_j = Z_j\gamma + \eta_j + \phi_j \tag{7}$$

where $\phi_j = \ln \hat{\alpha}_j - \ln \alpha_j$ is the sampling error on the hospital fixed effect. Equation (7) can be estimated using weighted least squares where the weight is the number of patients in the hospitals. Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2007) explain how to compute the standard errors and propose a R-square formula which accounts for the sampling error. We use their formulas in our empirical application. Note that for a given hospital, equation (7) is well defined only when there is at least one patient dying in the hospital over the 1998 – 2003 period (otherwise the quantity $\hat{\alpha}_j$ from which we take the log would be zero). This condition may not be verified for hospitals that have only a few patients. In fact, these hospitals have a negligible weight and they are dropped from our sample. We finally average equation (7) at the regional level and conduct a variance analysis for the resulting equation.

5 Results

Table 3 reports the estimation results of the first-stage equation (1). The demographic characteristics have the usual effect on the propensity to die. Females are more likely to die than males. This is consistent with care being more protective for males than for females possibly because of biological differences like the smaller target vessel size and the increased vessel tortuosity of females (Milcent *et al.*, 2007). However, the gender difference is significant only at younger ages (between 35 and 55 year old). Also, the propensity to die increases with age.

The severity index is found to have a positive effect on the propensity to die. Intuitively, one also expects secondary diagnoses to have a positive effect as they deteriorate health. This is true empirically for renal failure, stroke, heart failure, conduction disease, alcohol. Other secondary diagnosis have a more surprising negative effect: diabetes, obesity, excessive smoking, vascular disease, peripheral arterial disease, previous coronary artery disease, hypertension. These results may be explained by preventive health care. Indeed, these secondary diagnoses may point out at

patients who have been monitored more carefully before and after having a heart attack (Milcent, 2005).

All treatments have the expected negative effect on the propensity to die: CABG, catheterism, PTCA, other dilatation and stent. The stent, which is the most innovative procedure, has the strongest negative effect. After controlling for these treatments, the DRG index capturing the heaviness of surgical procedures has a positive effect on the propensity to die. This can reflect the increased chances to die because of more cumbersome and risky surgery.

[Insert Table 3]

From the estimated coefficients $\hat{\beta}$, we constructed an integrated hazard for each hospital using the Breslow's estimator and averaged the corresponding hospital survival functions by region (weighting by the number of patients at risk in the hospitals).¹¹ Regions at extremes are the same as when studying the raw data: Alsace (at the German border) usually exhibits the highest survival function and Languedoc-Roussillon (in the South-East) the lowest. Graph 5 represents the survival functions (as well as their confidence intervals) for these two extremes and for Ile-de-France (the Paris region).¹² The difference between the extreme regions are smaller but still significant.

[Insert Graph 5]

We quantify the regional disparities with the same indices as in the descriptive section 3.2 for the probability to die within 1, 5, 10 and 15 days (defined as one minus the survival function of the model). Results reported in Table 4 show that the difference in the probability to die within 15 days between the extreme regions has decreased from 80% to 47% (this corresponds to a 41%

¹¹This kind of aggregation is quite common in the labour literature. For instance, Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) estimate a wage equation that includes some firm fixed effects. They then compute some industry fixed effects as the averages of the estimated firm fixed effects for firms belonging to each industry (weighting the observations by the number of workers in the firms).

¹²Graph A3 in appendix represents the survival functions for all the regions and Table A2 ranks the regions according to survival after 15 days. Curves obtained with the model are not strictly comparable with those obtained from raw data with the Kaplan-Meier estimator as instantaneous hospital hazards were normalized with an *ad-hoc* rule. To get close to comparability, we multiplied instantaneous hospital hazards by a constant which was chosen such that in absence of hospital heterogeneity (i.e. $\theta_j(t) = \theta(t)$ for all t), the expected integrated hazard at day 1 is equal to the expected integrated hazard obtained from the raw data (defined as minus the logarithm of the Kaplan-Meier estimator). This normalization allows to obtain an average survival function of the same magnitude as the one obtained from raw data with the Kaplan-Meier estimator.

decrease). More systematic disparity indices like the coefficient of variation and the Gini index also decrease, but to a lesser extent (by 19% and 17%, respectively). In a variance-analysis spirit, we defined a pseudo- R^2 as one minus the ratio between the variance in the probability to die within a given number of days computed from the model and the variance computed from raw data. At 1 and 5 days, the pseudo- R^2 is nearly 60%. Hence, explanatory variables would explain more than half of the regional disparities in early death. However, it is lower at 10 days (48%), and decreases even more to reach 40% at 15 days. This suggests that part of the early regional disparities may be due to different timings of death events across regions. Also, there may be some specific regional behaviours for transfers and home returns which would affect the local composition of patients and hence would have an impact on the difference between the hospital survival functions obtained from the model and from the Kaplan-Meier estimators. Interestingly, the ranking of regions obtained for death within 15 days is not that different from the one obtained from the raw data (unweighted rank correlation: .70). This means that controlling for individual variables does not change much the ranking of regions.

[Insert Table 4]

We then supposed that each instantaneous hospital hazard writes multiplicatively as the product of a hospital fixed effect and a baseline hazard. The parameters of the multiplicative model are estimated using empirical moments as explained in the previous section. Graph 6 displays the baseline hazard and the confidence interval at each day. Remember that the weighted average of the instantaneous baseline hazards is normalized to zero. We obtain that the baseline hazard decreases sharply in the first two days and then more smoothly until the eighth day. It remains constant afterward. The sharp decrease just after entry in the hospital can be explained by violent deaths that are quite common in early days of heart attack.

[Insert Graph 6]

We then regress the hospital fixed effects on a set of hospital and geographic variables. Results are reported in Table 5 (estimated regional dummies corresponding to the specification of column 3 are reported in Appendix A3). When we only introduce hospital variables (column 1), the adjusted- R^2 is quite low at 0.13.¹³ It is larger at 0.23 when only geographic variables enter the specification

¹³This adjusted- R^2 accounts for the sampling error and its formula is given in Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2007).

(column 2). Interestingly, when introducing both groups of variables (column 3), the R^2 at 0.28 is below the sum of R^2 of the two separate regressions (0.36), which suggests that variables are quite correlated. Also, it is higher than the R^2 of each separate regression, which suggests that each of the two groups has some explanatory power of its own.

We now comment the sign of the estimated coefficients for the full specification (column 3). We find that the propensity to die is nearly the same in for-profit hospitals and public hospitals. This result may look surprising but it comes from the fact that we control for innovative treatments (mainly angioplasty and stent). If we drop the variables related to innovative treatments from the first-stage specification, the propensity to die in public hospitals becomes higher than in for-profit hospitals (see Table A3 in appendix). Hence, the higher efficiency of for-profit hospitals would come from a wider use of innovative treatments. We also find that the propensity to die in a NFP hospital is lower than in public or for-profit hospitals.

The proportion of patients in the hospital treated for an AMI has a negative and significant effect. It is possible that hospitals concentrating AMI patients are specialized in heart-related pathologies and thus have a higher efficiency. The number of beds as well as their occupation rate have no effect on mortality. The propensity to die is lower in hospitals with a higher proportion of beds in surgery (whether controlling for innovative treatments or not). In fact, hospitals with a high proportion of beds in surgery could be specialized in serious diseases and have a higher quality staff. The propensity to die also decreases with the occupation rate of beds in surgery (significantly at 10% only). It is possible that hospitals with a high occupation rate are also those which are the more efficient and the more likely to attract patients.

Among municipal variables, the presence of a poor area has a positive effect (significant at 10%) on the propensity to die, whereas the median income and the unemployment rate have no significant effect. The positive effect of the presence of a poor area can be explained with a deteriorated health of local people (the general health status being not captured with diagnoses variables).

The number of beds in the urban area has a positive significant effect which turns out to be negative but not significant when innovative treatments are not controlled for. An interpretation can be that larger markets propose more innovative treatments but also yield more congestion. These two effects would compensate but after controlling for the innovative treatments, only the congestion effects would remain. The Herfindahl index for the number of patients across hospitals computed at the urban area level has a significant negative effect. This result suggests that the fewer the hospitals in which patients are concentrated, the lower the propensity to die.

Finally, regional dummies always have a negative effect compared to the reference (Languedoc-Roussillon) and their effect is most often significant. Differences may be explained by unobserved regional factors such as the regional differences in the propensity to transfer patients when they are likely to die. Indeed, recall that we work only on patients who come from their place of residence and not from a transfer. Note that standard errors are quite large and two regions should be far enough in the distribution of regional effects for the difference between their effects to be significant. The ranking of regional effects is nearly uncorrelated with the probability to die within 15 days obtained from raw data (unweighted rank correlation: .02) and with that obtained from the model (unweighted rank correlation: -.11).

[Insert Table 5]

We now perform a variance analysis at the regional level. Taking the logarithm of equation (1) under the multiplicative assumption (4), and computing the average for any region r gives:

$$\frac{1}{N^r} \sum_{i|j(i) \in r} \ln \lambda(t | X_i, j(i)) = \overline{X^r} \beta + \overline{\ln \alpha^r} + \theta(t)$$

where N^r is the number of patients in region r , $\overline{X^r}$ is the regional average of individual explanatory variables and $\overline{\ln \alpha^r}$ is the regional average of hospital fixed effects weighted by the number of patients in the hospitals. It is possible to qualitatively assess the relative explanatory power of right-hand side terms computing their variance and their correlation with the left-hand side term (see Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis, 1999). In fact, the larger the variance and the correlation, the higher the explanatory power. In practice, as β and $\overline{\ln \alpha^r}$ are not observed, we use their estimators $\widehat{\beta}$ and $\widehat{\overline{\ln \alpha^r}}$ (the latter being defined as the weighted average of $\widehat{\ln \alpha_j}$) to compute the right-hand side terms. An estimator of the left-hand side term is obtained from the sum of right-hand side terms. Using the same approach, we also assess the explanatory power of $\overline{X_s^r} \widehat{\beta}$ for some sub-groups $\overline{X_s^r}$ of explanatory variables. Importantly, note that this procedure measures the explanatory power *ex ante* before any filtering process of patients through transfers or home returns. We can further assess the explanatory power of hospital and geographic variables. Taking the log of the expression of hospital fixed effects and averaging at the regional level, we get:

$$\overline{\ln \alpha^r} = \overline{Z^r} \gamma + \overline{\eta^r}$$

where $\overline{Z^r}$ and $\overline{\eta^r}$ are the regional averages of explanatory variables and random terms, respectively. We can assess the explanatory power of $\overline{Z^r} \gamma$ and $\overline{Z_s^r} \gamma$, for some sub-groups $\overline{Z_s^r}$ of explanatory variables, in the same way as for individual variables (replacing γ by its estimator).

We find that individual variables have a far larger power than hospital effects in explaining regional disparities in mortality (see Table 6a). Indeed, their variance is five to six times larger. Interestingly, among the individual variables, it is the innovative treatments which have the largest explanatory power. This means that regional disparities in innovative treatments are a key factor in explaining regional disparities in mortality. This has some important consequences for the regional funding of innovative equipments. Of course, the age-and-sex regional composition also plays a role. Interestingly, the hospital and geographic effects have a larger variance than the composition effects, which suggests that their role in explaining regional disparities is significant. Note that the sum of variances for groups of individual variables is far smaller than their sum. This comes from fairly large correlations between groups. In particular, regions where patients are aged and mostly females are also those in which more innovative treatments are performed (correlation between the demographic effects and the effect of innovative treatments: .57). When trying to explain regional disparities in hospital fixed effects, we find that hospital variables do not have much explanatory power (Table 6b). In particular, the local composition of ownership status does not play much. By contrast, geographic variables have a large explanatory power. The local size of the market (measured by the local number of beds) and the local concentration of patients play a significant role.¹⁴ This is not the case of municipality variables. Finally, residual local effects captured by regional dummies have a large variance. This means that some regional unobserved factors have a large effect on regional disparities in AMI death.

[Insert Table 6a and 6b] (8)

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we studied the regional disparities in mortality for patients admitted in hospitals for a heart attack. This was done using a unique matched patients-hospitals dataset over the 1998-2003 period constructed from exhaustive administrative records. For patients, this dataset contains some information on demographic characteristics (sex and age), diagnoses and treatments. For hospitals, it gives some details on the location, the status, the mode of reimbursement and the

¹⁴Note that the local size of the market and the local concentration of patients have an effect that is positively correlated with hospital fixed effects. However, their correlation with the overall integrated hazard (last column in Table 6b) is negative. This is because these effects are more than compensated by regional fixed effects and the effects of innovative treatments.

capacity.

We showed that regional disparities are fairly large. The difference in the propensity to die between the extreme regions reaches 80%. We analyzed the causes of these disparities using a Cox duration model stratified by hospitals. This model allows for a specific hospital baseline hazard and controls for individual observed heterogeneity. Hence, it captures differences in hospital behaviours when treating the patients. The survival functions of hospitals were averaged at the regional level to assess whether there are still some regional disparities after individual variables have been controlled for. Regional disparities decrease but remain significant: the difference in the propensity to die between the extreme regions is still 47%. Interestingly, the extent to which patients are treated with innovative procedures at the regional level plays a major role in the decrease of the disparities.

We then assessed to what extent the remaining regional disparities could be explained with the local composition of hospitals and geographic effects. This was done regressing hospital hazards on hospital and geographic variables, and averaging the model at the regional level. We found that once treatments have been controlled for, hospital variables do not play much. By contrast, geographic variables, and in particular the local concentration of patients, play a significant role. The more patients are concentrated in a few large hospitals rather than many small ones, the lower the mortality. After hospital and geographic variables have been controlled for, some significant regional disparities still remain.

The scope of our analysis is limited because patients were not tracked in the data when they were transferred to another hospital. For patients who were transferred, we had to consider that the length of stay was censored. An interesting extension of our work would be to study the strategic behaviour of hospitals when transferring patients. Indeed, some hospitals may try to minimize their mortality rate by transferring the patients who are the most likely to die even when they are well equipped and can conduct some innovative treatments. Others, like local hospitals, may try to increase the propensity to survive of some patients by sending them to more efficient establishments. It should be possible to conduct such an analysis in the future when data tracking patients (which exist) will be made available for research.

7 Appendix: second-stage estimation

In this appendix, we explain how to construct some estimators of the baseline hazard and hospital fixed effects. We first average equation (4) across time, weighting the observations by the number of patients at risk at each date. We obtain:

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_t N_t \theta_j(t) = \alpha_j \frac{1}{N} \sum_t N_t \theta(t)$$

where N_t is the number of patients at risk at the beginning of period t , $N = \sum_t N_t$ with \sum_t the sum from 1 to T days (with $T = 30$ in the application). A natural identifying restriction is that the average of instantaneous hazards equals one: $\frac{1}{N} \sum_t N_t \theta(t) = 1$. We obtain:

$$\alpha_j = \frac{1}{N} \sum_t N_t \theta_j(t) \tag{9}$$

It is possible to construct an estimator of hospital fixed effects from this formula, but weights (namely: N_t) are not hospital-specific and thus do not reflect hospital specificities. Hence, we propose another estimator of hospital fixed effects in the sequel which we believe better capture hospital specificities.

We also average equation (4) across hospitals, weighting by the number of patients at risk (summed across all dates) in each hospital. We get:

$$\frac{1}{N} \sum_j N^j \theta_j(t) = \frac{1}{N} \left(\sum_j N^j \alpha_j \right) \theta(t)$$

where $N^j = \sum_t N_{jt}$ with N_{jt} the number of patients at risk in hospital j at the beginning of date t (such that $N = \sum_j N^j$). Replacing α_j with its expression (9), we obtain: $\theta(t) =$

$\left(\frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{j,t} N^j N_t \theta_j(t) \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_j N^j \theta_j(t) \right)$. An estimator of the hazard rate at date t in hospital j can be constructed from the Breslow's estimator such that $\hat{\theta}_j(t) = \hat{\Theta}_j(t) - \hat{\Theta}_j(t-1)$. A natural estimator of the baseline hazard is then:

$$\hat{\theta}(t) = \left(\frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{j,t} N^j N_t \hat{\theta}_j(t) \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{N} \sum_j N^j \hat{\theta}_j(t) \right)$$

We then construct an estimator of a given hospital fixed effect α_j averaging equation (4) across time for this hospital and weighting by the number of patients at risk at the beginning of each

day in this hospital. We obtain:

$$\frac{1}{N^j} \sum_t N_{jt} \theta_j(t) = \alpha_j \frac{1}{N^j} \sum_t N_{jt} \theta(t)$$

An estimator of the hospital fixed effect is then:

$$\hat{\alpha}_j = \left(\frac{1}{N^j} \sum_t N_{jt} \hat{\theta}(t) \right)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{N^j} \sum_t N_{jt} \hat{\theta}_j(t) \right) \quad (10)$$

We also computed the asymptotic variances of $\hat{\theta} = \left(\hat{\theta}(1), \dots, \hat{\theta}(T) \right)'$ and $\hat{\alpha} = (\hat{\alpha}_1, \dots, \hat{\alpha}_J)'$, denoted V_θ et V_α , with the delta method. Indeed, the covariance matrix of $\hat{\theta}_J = \left(\hat{\theta}_1(1), \dots, \hat{\theta}_J(T) \right)'$ can be estimated from Ridder et Tunalı (1999). Its estimator is denoted \hat{V}_{θ_J} . We can then compute the estimators: $\hat{V}_\theta = \left(\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}}{\partial \theta'_j} \right) \hat{V}_{\theta_J} \left(\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}'}{\partial \theta_j} \right)$ and $\hat{V}_\alpha = \left(\frac{\partial \hat{\alpha}}{\partial \theta'_j} \right) \hat{V}_{\theta_J} \left(\frac{\partial \hat{\alpha}'}{\partial \theta_j} \right)$. The vectors $\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}}{\partial \theta_j}$ and $\frac{\partial \hat{\alpha}}{\partial \theta_j}$ are given by:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}(t)}{\partial \hat{\theta}_k(\tau)} = \frac{N N^k}{\sum_{j,t} N^j N_t \hat{\theta}_j(t)} 1_{\{t=\tau\}} - \frac{N N^k N_\tau}{\left[\sum_{j,t} N^j N_t \hat{\theta}_j(t) \right]^2} \sum_j N^j \hat{\theta}(t) \quad (11)$$

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\alpha}_j}{\partial \hat{\theta}_k(\tau)} = \frac{N_{k\tau}}{\sum_t N_{j,t} \hat{\theta}(t)} 1_{\{k=j\}} - \hat{\alpha}_j \frac{\sum_t N_{j,t} \frac{\partial \hat{\theta}(t)}{\partial \hat{\theta}_k(\tau)}}{\sum_t N_{j,t} \hat{\theta}(t)} \quad (12)$$

In practice, to simplify the computations, we neglected the second term on the right-hand side of (12). This is only a slight approximation that does not have much impact on the estimated variance of $\hat{\alpha}_j$. It amounts to neglect in (10) the variations of $\frac{1}{N^j} \sum_t N_{jt} \hat{\theta}(t)$ with respect to the terms $\hat{\theta}_j(t)$ compared to the variations of $\frac{1}{N^j} \sum_t N_{jt} \hat{\theta}_j(t)$ which is far larger. Put differently, $\hat{\theta}(t)$ is supposed to be non-random in (10).

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Table 1: disparity indices
for the regional averages of individual variables

	Mean	Min	Max	Max/Min	Std. Dev.	Coeff. of variation	Gini
Number of AMI patients	21448	6335	44393	7.008	11534	0.538	0.295
Death	0.080	0.059	0.098	1.675	0.0098	0.123	0.070
Female, 35-55 year old	0.024	0.015	0.032	2.145	0.0050	0.207	0.117
Female, 55-65 year old	0.026	0.021	0.034	1.609	0.0031	0.117	0.066
Female, 65-75 year old	0.072	0.060	0.089	1.475	0.0074	0.103	0.056
Female, 75-85 year old	0.109	0.093	0.134	1.435	0.0100	0.092	0.050
Female, more than 85 year old	0.087	0.059	0.110	1.852	0.0126	0.144	0.081
Male, 35-55 year old	0.187	0.135	0.239	1.771	0.0291	0.155	0.088
Male, 55-65 year old	0.139	0.116	0.158	1.372	0.0137	0.099	0.057
Male, 65-75 year old	0.175	0.145	0.195	1.343	0.0139	0.079	0.042
Male, 75-85 year old	0.134	0.105	0.159	1.510	0.0172	0.129	0.074
Male, more than 85 year old	0.046	0.027	0.062	2.259	0.0090	0.196	0.108
Excessive smoking	0.120	0.062	0.196	3.160	0.0350	0.293	0.164
Alcohol problems	0.012	0.004	0.017	4.148	0.0029	0.248	0.137
Obesity	0.063	0.018	0.111	6.273	0.0196	0.313	0.170
Diabetes mellitus	0.155	0.092	0.208	2.254	0.0240	0.156	0.077
Hypertension (MH)	0.299	0.203	0.373	1.833	0.0369	0.123	0.067
Renal failure	0.050	0.028	0.078	2.760	0.0085	0.171	0.088
Conduction disease (TC)	0.197	0.134	0.247	1.843	0.0218	0.111	0.060
Peripheral arterial disease (AR)	0.063	0.036	0.109	3.019	0.0145	0.231	0.113
Vascular disease (VC)	0.044	0.025	0.078	3.109	0.0108	0.248	0.128
History of coronary artery disease (COEUR)	0.040	0.017	0.070	4.000	0.0100	0.250	0.134
Stroke (CER)	0.032	0.020	0.048	2.448	0.0055	0.173	0.092
Heart failure (IC)	0.158	0.128	0.204	1.598	0.0184	0.116	0.064
Severity index (IGS)	0.283	0.143	0.438	3.054	0.0737	0.261	0.147
Cabbage or Coronary Bypass surgery (CABG)	0.009	0.001	0.036	36.312	0.0068	0.740	0.372
Cardiac catheterization	0.190	0.130	0.271	2.081	0.0347	0.182	0.100
Percutaneous transluminal coronary Angioplasty	0.054	0.010	0.106	10.914	0.0270	0.497	0.277
Other dilatation than PTCA	0.002	0.000	0.005	\	0.0016	0.994	0.534
Percutaneous revascularization using coronary stents (PCI – stenting)	0.245	0.107	0.411	3.836	0.0909	0.372	0.206
Surgical French DRGs (GHMC)	0.037	0.016	0.077	4.650	0.0154	0.418	0.232

Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003). Observed used to construct the disparity indices are weighted by the number of AMI patients.

Table 2: disparity indices
for the regional averages of hospital and geographic variables

	Mean	Min	Max	Max/Min	Std. Dev.	Coeff. of variation	Gini
Proba. of death within 1 day (KM)	0.018	0.012	0.023	1.940	0.003	0.158	0.089
Proba. of death within 5 days (KM)	0.055	0.038	0.066	1.721	0.008	0.139	0.078
Proba. of death within 10 days (KM)	0.088	0.061	0.107	1.749	0.011	0.122	0.067
Proba. of death within 15 days (KM)	0.127	0.085	0.153	1.800	0.016	0.128	0.070
Number of patients	4466	2363	9974	4.221	2235	0.501	0.231
Number of AMI patients	386	173	968	5.585	233	0.604	0.270
Proportion of AMI patients	0.089	0.061	0.157	2.561	0.0276	0.310	0.136
Public	0.754	0.590	0.935	1.584	0.1002	0.133	0.076
Not-for-profit	0.045	0.000	0.261	\	0.0525	1.157	0.559
For-profit	0.201	0.060	0.367	6.129	0.0855	0.426	0.242
Unemployment rate	0.158	0.126	0.225	1.789	0.0282	0.178	0.098
Poor area in the municipality	0.638	0.363	0.947	2.612	0.1944	0.305	0.173
Municipality median income	13927	11552	17455	1.511	1601	0.115	0.060
Proportion of beds in surgery	0.392	0.323	0.451	1.395	0.030	0.076	0.043
Number of beds in surgery	753	243	3172	13.062	939	1.246	0.469
Proportion of surgery occupied beds	0.855	0.781	0.901	1.153	0.0318	0.037	0.021
Number of beds	1933	595	8488	14.253	2538	1.313	0.487
Proportion of occupied beds	0.819	0.774	0.865	1.118	0.0247	0.030	0.017
Number of beds in the urban area	8251	1107	47033	42.475	15016	1.820	0.664
Herfindahl index for hospitals in the urban area	0.592	0.130	0.893	6.874	0.226	0.382	0.206

Source: computed from the PMSI, the SAE, and the municipality datasets (1998-2003). Observed used to construct the disparity indices are weighted by the number of AMI patients.

Table 3: estimated coefficients for the individual variables

Variable	Estimate
	0.5426***
Female, 55-65 year old	(0.1113)
Female, 65-75 year old	1.0444***
	(0.0965)
Female, 75-85 year old	1.3935***
	(0.0943)
Female, more than 85 year old	1.7681***
	(0.0941)
Male, 35-55 year old	-0.3561***
	(0.1015)
Male, 55-65 year old	0.2313**
	(0.0986)
Male, 65-75 year old	0.8173***
	(0.0948)
Male, 75-85 year old	1.2867***
	(0.0941)
Male, more than 85 year old	1.6713***
	(0.0948)
Excessive smoking	-0.4751***
	(0.0410)
Alcohol problems	0.3311***
	(0.0654)
Obesity	-0.2424***
	(0.0413)
Diabetes mellitus	-0.0595***
	(0.0180)
Hypertension (MH)	-0.5795***
	(0.0155)
Renal failure	0.3636***
	(0.0183)
Conduction disease (TC)	0.8490***
	(0.0126)
Peripheral arterial disease (AR)	-0.033
	(0.0242)
Vascular disease (VC)	-0.4508***
	(0.0282)
History of coronary artery disease (COEUR)	-0.2408***
	(0.0290)
Stroke (CER)	0.2967***
	(0.0237)
Heart failure (IC)	0.0569***
	(0.0134)
Severity index (IGS)	0.1105***
	(0.0148)
Cabbage or Coronary Bypass surgery (CABG)	-0.7477***
	(0.0853)
Cardiac catheterization	-1.2587***
	(0.0299)
Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty	-0.6760***
	(0.0385)
Other dilatation than PTCA	-0.874***
	(0.2181)
Percutaneous revascularization using coronary stents (PCI – stenting)	-1.0207***
	(0.0261)
Surgical French DRGs (GHMC)	0.2852***
	(0.0358)

Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003). Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. Number of observations: 341, 861; mean log-likelihood: -0.449369.

Table 4: disparity indices
for the regional probability to die obtained from the model

	Mean	Min	Max	Max/Min	Std. Dev.	Coeff. of variation	Gini
Probability of death within 1 day	0.019	0.015	0.024	1.549	0.002	0.098	0.053
Probability of death within 5 days	0.057	0.050	0.073	1.458	0.005	0.084	0.043
Probability of death within 10 days	0.086	0.074	0.108	1.449	0.008	0.089	0.047
Probability of death within 15 days	0.116	0.098	0.144	1.471	0.013	0.108	0.058

Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003). Note: for a given region, the survival function is constructed as the regional average of the model survival functions computed for every hospitals located within the region.

Table 5: regression of hospital fixed effects on hospital and geographic variables

Variable	Regression (1)	Regression (2)	Regression (3)
Constant	-5.917*** (0.216)	-6.195*** (1.445)	-7.003*** (1.517)
For-profit hospital	0.286*** (0.041)		0.014 (0.056)
Not-for-profit hospital	0.016 (0.071)		-0.166** (0.075)
Proportion of AMI patients in the hospital	-1.049*** (0.175)		-0.468** (0.234)
Number of beds (in log)	0.107*** (0.016)		0.006 (0.024)
Occupation rate of beds	0.144 (0.223)		0.197 (0.224)
Proportion of beds in surgery	-0.142 (0.090)		-0.303*** (0.091)
Occupation rate of beds in surgery	-0.263 (0.161)		-0.267* (0.157)
Median municipality income		0.074 (0.148)	0.177 (0.155)
Presence of a poor area in the municipality		0.079** (0.031)	0.065** (0.031)
Municipality unemployment rate		-0.321 (0.565)	0.046 (0.583)
Number of beds in the urban area		0.064*** (0.022)	0.061** (0.027)
Herfindahl index for the healthcare structure		-0.250*** (0.089)	-0.283*** (0.094)
Regional dummies	Non	Oui	Oui
Number of hospitals	789	834	789
Corresponding number of patients	332,827	333,810	332,827
Adjusted-R ²	0.201	0.230	0.282

Source: computed from the PMSI, the SAE, and the municipality datasets (1998-2003). Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. We introduced a dummy for the municipality not to be in an urban area (*dummy for rural area*), and a dummy for the municipality to be related to several urban areas (*dummy for multi-polarized municipality*).

Table 6a: variance analysis at the regional level (first stage)

Group of variables from which we consider the effect	Variance	Correlation with the integrated hazard
Integrated hazard	.036856	1.000
Individual variables (averaged at the regional level)	.028623	.898
Innovative treatments	.010155	.740
Non-innovative treatments	.000039	-.136
Diagnoses	.002114	.396
Demographic variables (age x sex)	.005198	.833
Log-hospital fixed effects (averaged at the regional level)	.007159	.475


Source: computed from the PMSI, the SAE, and the municipality datasets (1998-2003).

Table 6b: variance analysis at the regional level (third stage)


Group of variables from which we consider the effect	Variance	Corr. with log-hosp. fixed effects	Correlation with the integrated hazard
Log-hospital fixed effects (averaged at the regional level)	.007159	1.000	.475
Hospital and geographic variables (averaged at the regional level)	.006012	.987	.403
Hospital variables	.000400	.106	.738
Status and mode of reimbursement	.000078	.319	.624
Proportion of AMI patients	.000110	.083	.387
Beds (capacity and occupation rate)	.000136	-.012	.444
Geographic Variables	.006319	.939	.210
Municipality variables	.010411	.193	-.448
Income-related variables	.000096	-.512	-.290
Dummies for the municipality to be rural or multi-polarized	.000137	.086	-.410
Number of beds in the urban area	.002314	.236	-.284
Herfindahl index for healthcare structure	.002333	.353	-.357
Regional dummies	.010347	.541	.614

Source: computed from the PMSI, the SAE, and the municipality datasets (1998-2003).


Graph 1: Regional proportions of patients treated by for-profit hospitals



Graph 2: Regional proportions of patients treated with stents




Graph 3: Regional probabilities to die within fifteen days (in %)




Note: for a given region, the probability to die is constructed as one minus the regional average of Kaplan-Meier estimators computed for every hospitals located within the region.

Graph 4: Sample of regional survival functions (Kaplan-Meier)




Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003). Note: for a given region, the survival function is constructed as the regional average of Kaplan-Meier estimators computed for every hospitals located within the region.

Graph 5: Sample of regional survival functions (model)



Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003). Note: for a given region, the survival function is constructed as the regional average of the model survival functions computed for every hospitals located within the region.

Graph 6: Baseline instantaneous hazard for exit to death



Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003).

Appendix

Table A1: regional probability to die within 15 days (Kaplan-Meier)

Region code	Name	Probability to die
91	Languedoc-Roussillon	15.31%
22	Picardie	15.28%
25	Basse-Normandie	14.48%
53	Bretagne	14.45%
73	Midi-Pyrénées	13.97%
52	Pays de la Loire	13.67%
72	Aquitaine	13.64%
24	Centre	13.51%
83	Auvergne	13.46%
21	Champagne-Ardenne	12.96%
93	Provence – Alpes Côte d’Azur	12.93%
54	Poitou–Charentes	12.87%
31	Nord-Pas-de-Calais	12.73%
26	Bourgogne	12.71%
23	Haute-Normandie	12.60%
43	Franche-Comté	12.13%
82	Rhône-Alpes	12.03%
74	Limousin	11.88%
41	Lorraine	11.67%
11	Ile-de-France	9.93%
42	Alsace	8.51%

Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003). Note: for a given region, the probability to die is equal to one minus the survival function. An estimator of this survival function is constructed as the regional average of Kaplan-Meier estimators computed for every hospitals located within the region.

Table A2: regional probability to die within 15 days (model)

Numéro de région	Nom	Probability to die
91	Languedoc-Roussillon	14.40% (1)
72	Aquitaine	13.95% (7)
93	Provence – Alpes Côte d’Azur	11.06% (11)
83	Auvergne	12.85% (9)
22	Picardie	12.00% (2)
31	Nord-Pas-de-Calais	11.92% (13)
24	Centre	11.68% (8)
73	Midi-Pyrénées	11.68% (5)
53	Bretagne	11.25% (4)
25	Basse-Normandie	11.13% (3)
82	Rhône-Alpes	11.11% (17)
11	Ile-de-France	11.06% (20)
41	Lorraine	11.03% (19)
43	Franche-Comté	10.81% (16)
52	Pays de la Loire	10.60% (6)
21	Champagne-Ardenne	10.59% (10)
23	Haute-Normandie	10.47% (15)
74	Limousin	9.92% (18)
54	Poitou–Charentes	9.87% (12)
26	Bourgogne	9.85% (14)
42	Alsace	9.84% (21)

Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003). Note: for a given region, for a given region, the probability to die is equal to one minus the survival function. An estimator of this survival function is constructed as the regional average of the model survival functions computed for every hospitals located within the region. In the last column, the ranking of the regions obtained from raw data is reported in parenthesis.

Table A3: regression of hospital fixed effects on aggregated variables,
innovative treatments are not controlled for

Variable	Regression (1)	Regression (2)	Regression (3)
Constant	-4.926*** (0.200)	-5.518*** (1.400)	-5.838*** (1.439)
For-profit hospital	-0.211*** (0.038)		-0.220*** (0.053)
Not-for-profit hospital	-0.257*** (0.066)		-0.232*** (0.071)
Proportion of AMI patients in the hospital	-0.604*** (0.162)		-0.491** (0.222)
Number of beds (in log)	-0.012 (0.015)		-0.009 (0.023)
Occupation rate of beds	-0.049 (0.207)		-0.115 (0.212)
Proportion of beds in surgery	-0.296*** (0.084)		-0.284*** (0.086)
Occupation rate of beds in surgery	-0.101 (0.150)		-0.127 (0.150)
Median municipality income		0.071 (0.143)	0.172 (0.147)
Presence of a poor area in the municipality		0.010 (0.030)	0.001 (0.030)
Municipality unemployment rate		0.242 (0.547)	0.437 (0.551)
Number of beds in the urban area		-0.043** (0.021)	-0.052** (0.026)
Herfindahl index for the healthcare structure		-0.087 (0.086)	-0.275*** (0.088)
Regional dummies	Non	Oui	Oui
Number of hospitals	789	834	789
Corresponding number of patients	332,827	333,810	332,827
Adjusted-R ²	0.159	0.155	0.270


Source: computed from the PMSI, the SAE, and the municipality datasets (1998-2003). Note: ***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%. We introduced a dummy for the municipality not to be in an urban area (*dummy for rural area*), and a dummy for the municipality to be related to several urban areas (*dummy for multi-polarized municipality*).

Table A4: regional dummies obtained from the hospital fixed-effect regression

Region code	Name	Coefficient	
91	Languedoc-Roussillon	< Reference >	(1)
	Basse-Normandie	-0.170*	(3)
25		(0.090)	
	Lorraine	-0.174**	(19)
41		(0.088)	
	Picardie	-0.181**	(2)
22		(0.086)	
	Bretagne	-0.181**	(4)
53		(0.080)	
	Aquitaine	-0.189**	(7)
72		(0.075)	
	Champagne-Ardenne	-0.227**	(10)
21		(0.090)	
	Provence – Alpes Côte d’Azur	-0.228***	(11)
93		(0.071)	
	Bourgogne	-0.228**	(4)
26		(0.088)	
	Centre	-0.229***	(8)
24		(0.083)	
	Limousin	-0.233**	(18)
74		(0.102)	
	Auvergne	-0.233***	(9)
83		(0.089)	
	Franche-Comté	-0.242**	(16)
43		(0.101)	
	Poitou–Charentes	-0.242***	(12)
54		(0.087)	
	Pays de la Loire	-0.261***	(6)
52		(0.079)	
	Rhône-Alpes	-0.264***	(17)
82		(0.074)	
	Midi-Pyrénées	-0.267***	(5)
73		(0.077)	
	Nord-Pas-de-Calais	-0.284***	(13)
31		(0.070)	
	Alsace	-0.294***	(21)
42		(0.098)	
	Haute-Normandie	-0.316***	(15)
23		(0.087)	
	Ile-de-France	-0.583***	(20)
11		(0.108)	


Source: computed from the PMSI, the SAE, and the municipality datasets (1998-2003). Note: in the last column, the ranking of the regions obtained from raw data is reported in parenthesis.

Graph A1: Map of the French Regions




Regions. 11: Ile-de-France; 21: Champagne-Ardenne; 22: Picardie; 23: Haute-Normandie; 24: Centre; 25: Basse-Normandie; 26: Bourgogne; 31: Nord Pas-de-Calais; 41: Lorraine; 42: Alsace; 43: Franche-Comté; 52: Pays de la Loire; 53: Bretagne; 54: Poitou-Charentes; 72: Aquitaine; 73: Midi-Pyrénées; 74: Limousin; 82: Rhônes-Alpes; 83: Auvergne; 91: Languedoc-Roussillon; 93: Provence - Alpes Côtés d'Azur.

Graph A2: Regional survival functions (Kaplan-Meier)



Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003). Note: for a given region, the survival function is constructed as the regional average of Kaplan-Meier estimators computed for every hospitals located within the region.

Graph A3: Regional survival functions (model)



Source: computed from the PMSI dataset (1998-2003). Note: for a given region, the survival function is constructed as the regional average of the model survival functions computed for every hospitals located within the region.