

Muslims in Indonesia: Socio-economic and Demographic Profile¹

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Changing Economic-political Landscape and Population Policies

Although Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country, it is not an Islamic country. Indonesia is not a country that implements the Syariah Law as the positive law. Indonesia is neither a theocratic nor completely secular country. The efforts toward establishing an Islamic country remain alive, but the concept is not favoured by majority Muslims. Indonesia has undergone social, economic and political transformations, bringing about tremendous changes in its population. Indonesian economy was in stable conditions before it was severely hit by the 1997/98 crisis which forced the President Suharto to step down and paved the way for the Muslim-majority country of Indonesia to experience democracy.

In 1998, the growth rate of economy dipped down to a negative 13.1%. The economy then improved with the growth rate of 0.8% in 1999, and further accelerated to 4.8% in 2000. The period of 2000-2007 was the stabilization, recovery and resumption of economic growth (Van der Eng 2006) when the increasing growth rate continued and reached its highest growth of 6.3% in 2007, a decade after the Asian crisis. Amidst the global crisis starting in 2008, the Indonesian's economy is still sound with the growth expected to be around 4.0 – 5.0% in 2009.


One of the most pressing problems facing Indonesia in the early New Order era (1966-1998) was overpopulation relative to its economic condition. Before the New Order era, Indonesia had high fertility rates with about five to six children per woman. Its population was about 97 million in 1961, and from the economic point of views, Indonesia in the 1960s was one of the least developed countries in the world, with per capita GDP at about USD50. Recognising

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that the norm of big families was a restraint to economic development, the government started to implement the highly supported family planning programme in 1968, soon after the political regime changed.

The changes in political regimes in particular had contributed to different population policies since the country's independence in 1945, from a pro-natalist policy during the Old Order era (1945-1967) to an anti-natalist policy during the New Order era (1967-1998) and a more relaxed population policy under the Reform era (1998 until present). The Old Order era did not see the size of the population as a problem, though the population size of Indonesia was the fifth largest in the world. During the old order era, Tjan (1960) argued that over population was a relative concept, depending on the performance of the economy. With higher productivity, the Indonesian economy could afford to feed a large number of people. He argued that Indonesia could accommodate 200 million people, which was more than double the estimated population in 1960 of 89.8 million. Hull and Hull (2005) stated that President Soekarno frequently said that Indonesia could feed 250 million population.

The anti-natalist policy then came to actions during the New Order era and had produced a very intensive family planning program since the end of 1960s. The New Order Era in particular has successfully transformed the demographic features from both high fertility and mortality rates to low fertility and mortality rates. The total fertility rate (TFR) of Indonesia has been declining from 5.61 in the late 1960s to 2.34 in the period of 1996-1999. See Figure 1. At the same time, infant mortality rate was as high as 145 per 1,000 live births, and declined to 46 per 1,000 live births by the end of 1990s.



Source: Compiled from Badan Pusat Statistik (2006a).

As a result, the annual population growth rate of Indonesia has slowed down during 1980s, after reaching the peak at 2.3% in 1971-1980. It already reached 1.4% in 1990-2000. The growth continued to slowdown and it was as low as 1.2% in the early twenty-first century. However, the size of population will continue to increase in the next several decades. The effect of the programs of the National Family Planning was particularly significant in Java, Bali, and in urban areas in Sumatra and Kalimantan. The success of the programs there seemed to be directly linked to a growing awareness and effective use of modern contraceptives, easy access and availability of birth controls, rising women's education, and women's increasing tendency to postpone marriage. In the early New Order era, the population was most dramatic among the rice-growing peasants of Java and Bali. In 1980 the islands of Java, Madura, and Bali, which comprised 6.9% of the nation's land area, were home to 63.6% of Indonesia's population. These major islands had a population density of more than 500 persons per square kilometer, five times that of the most densely populated Outer Islands.

Even though the growth rate of Indonesia's population had been decreasing over the decades since independence, the population continued to grow and population density increased significantly, particularly on the main islands. Since the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Indonesia has become the fourth most populous country in the world, after China, India, and the US. It contributed approximately 3.5% of the world population in 2000 (United Nations, 2007). The latest population census in 2000 showed an estimate of 205.8 million population, an increased from 119.1 million in 1971, based on the government publication (Biro Pusat Statistik 1975, Badan Pusat Statistik 2001). Yet, the number of Indonesia's population reported in details in the 2000 population census was about 201.2 million, with the difference due to the non-response population during the census time as well as problems of enumeration in a number of provinces experiencing internal conflicts during the census. These provinces include Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku and Papua experienced internal conflicts.

This paper aims to specifically examine the socio-economic and demographic characteristics of Muslims in Indonesia. A number of variables are selected for the analysis. The profile is primarily based on the analysis of the raw data of the 2000 Population Census. However, this does not limit the analysis from employing other information from various surveys as proxies to capture others issues experienced by the Muslims in Indonesia, for example, a discussion on internal migration across provinces. The novelty of the paper lies on the analysis of Indonesians by religion, which is an expansion from my previous study (Arifin 2009) focusing only on the majority group of Muslims. This paper enriches previous studies (Abbasi-Shavazi and Jones, 2005; Rifa'i and Dwiyanto, 2005) exploring population dynamics and socio-economic and demographic characteristics of Muslim-majority populations from the population as a whole as a reflection of the Muslims. The published information of the censuses on Indonesians by religion is only limited to age and sex composition. Apart from these two variables, this paper looks at

provincial variation, and socio-economic variation in relation to educational attainment, labour force participation and employment, and marital status. Another novelty of the paper is a discussion on fertility of the Muslims and Muslims migrants in Indonesia.

Before discussing the demographic profile of the Muslims including a discussion on internal migration of the Muslims in comparison with international migration of Indonesians as well as an emerging presence of foreigners who are majority non-Muslims, the following section discusses the feature of the 2000 population census. The next section discusses the socio-economic background of the Muslims and concluding remarks ends the paper.

The 2000 Population Census

This analysis on this paper is based on the analysis of the raw data of the 2000 Indonesia Population census, since it is the latest census in which information on religion is available. The 2000 Population Census was conducted between June and August 2000, with the official census reference date set at 1 July 2000. It was the fifth census taken after the Independence of the archipelagic Republic of Indonesia. The four previous censuses were taken in 1961, 1971, 1980 and 1990. The next population census will be conducted in 2010. Improvements have been made in many aspects from one to the next census, which include methodology, concepts, questionnaire design and covered areas (Surbakti, Praptoprijoko, and Darmesto 2000). The 2000 census has a significant feature of its 100% coverage for all questions which makes this census the first one having full coverage. Therefore all available variables have smaller sampling error than previous censuses which generally had two stages of enumeration: complete and sample enumerations. Sample enumeration in the previous censuses covered a small size of sample enumeration, 3.7% in 1971 and 5.8% in both 1980 and 1990 censuses. The 2000 population census gathered basic information such as age, sex, and relationship to the head of household), and other information on place of birth, occupation, religion, educational attainment, migration status, fertility and mortality related questions in the complete enumeration. The complete enumeration in the previous censuses only included basic information. (Surbakti, Praptoprijoko, and Darmesto 2000).

With the implementation of regional autonomy in the country, population data of small administrative area is a basic necessity for national or regional development plans. In the case of Indonesia, a good civil registration is not available yet, hence, population census, especially the 2000 census becomes the only complete data source of Indonesia's population situation. The 2000 Population Census was aimed to provide users with small area statistics. Village is the

smallest administrative unit in the country, therefore, it is expected that statistics of villages could be established. However, this paper is not aimed to go further at providing statistics at the village level, instead limits its analysis of Muslims in Indonesia in general and to some extent considers geographical variation across provinces. Socio-economic background variables for the analysis are educational attainment, labour force participation and employment, and marital status. It should be noted that the geographical boundary to define migration in this census takes different form from the previous censuses which enables to consider a smaller boundary, a district. The analysis provided in Table 6 here takes a district as the boundary.

As previously mentioned, the 2000 population census gathered information from more than 201.2 individuals, which is a huge data set. As argued in details by Hull (2001) this census should be understood in the context of Indonesia newly found democracy which has changed public attitudes towards the implementation of the census, security problems in some areas during the enumeration period, limited government budget, and rules relating to determination of residence status. Despite all of these problems, this 2000 population census was still the most complete and ambitious one in its history.

Demographic Profile Muslims in Indonesia

Size and Growth

Although Indonesia is the Muslim-majority country, it is a multi-religious country, which officially recognized six religions: Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism². Other religions are not allowed, yet in the Indonesian surveys/censuses there is an option of "Others" for those who do not belong to one of the six official religions. Indonesians must have a religion and must choose one from the six official religions. Not having a religion is not politically correct. Because an individual must choose a religion, at least on their identity card (*KTP – Kartu Tanda Penduduk*), there are also individuals who embrace religions only on the identity card. They may declare their religion on paper, but they do not practice it. "Anecdotal" observations show that there is an increasing number of "free thinker", though in their identity cards they belonged to one of the six official religions (Ananta and Arifin 2008a). However, with

² In the history of Indonesia, Confucianism has its own story and been affected by the political turmoil. In 1965, Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia, issued a presidential decision stipulating six officially recognized religions, namely, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism, and Confucianism. When Suharto, the second president, came to power in 1967, he still continued his predecessor policy on religion, but in 1979 his cabinet decided to de-recognised Confucianism. Details discussion on the Confucianism in Indonesia can be read in Suryadinata (1998). Therefore, Confucianism was last included in the 1971 population census, and in the following censuses (1980, 1990 and 2000), it was recorded under category of "others". However, the post Suharto era, especially under the fourth president of Abdurrahman Wahid, the law against Confucianism was repealed and is now officially recognized as a religion in Indonesia.

respect to other religions in the country, the focus of the paper is on the Muslims in Indonesia. Therefore, most of results are simplified into three groups of religious followers, Muslims, Christians and others. Christians include Protestants and Catholics.

Based on the 2000 population census, as presented in Table 1, the Muslims in Indonesia accounted for the majority of 88.2% of the 201.2 million population, an increase from 87.5% in 1971. They numbered 177.5 million in 2000, which was 75% bigger than the figure in 1971³. The 177.5 million Muslims have made Indonesia the first largest Muslim country in the world with Pakistan, Bangladesh and India standing at the second, third and fourth⁴. Islam first gained a foothold between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries in coastal regions of Sumatra, northern Java, and Kalimantan. Islam probably came to these regions in the form of mystical Sufi tradition. Sufism easily gained local acceptance and became synthesized with local customs. Islam arrived through traders and merchants from Gujarat, Southwest India.

Table 1. Population of Muslims and Other Religious Followers: Indonesia, 1971-2000

Religious Follower	1971		2000		Annual* Growth Rate 1971-2000
	Number (in millions)	Percent	Number (in millions)	Percent	
Muslims	103,579,496	87.5	177,528,624	88.2	1.86
Christians	8,741,706	7.4	17,954,983	8.9	2.48
Others	6,046,648	5.1	5,758,294	2.9	-0.17
Total	118,367,850	100.0	201,241,901	100.0	1.83

Note: Christians consists of Catholics and Protestants, while others consists of Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians and others. Annual growth rate is calculated using the exponential formula: $r = \ln(P_t/P_0) * 100/t$
Source: Compiled and calculated from Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta (2003).

Within the same period, the percentage of Christians increased from 7.4% to 8.9%, or their number increased slightly more than double from 8.7 million in 1971 to almost 18.0 million in 2000. It has been observed from Table 1 that Muslims and Christians are increasing with different annual growth rates. The Christian showed the fastest growth rate of 2.5 per cent in the period of 1971-2000. The corresponding growth rate for Muslims was slower, 1.9 per cent. On the other hand, the contribution of other religions which includes Hindus, Buddhists, Confucians and others declined in both absolute and relative numbers within the same period⁵. The different trend across religious groups is sometimes made into a political issue. The

³ The information on religion based on the 1961 population census, the first census after Indonesia's independence in 1945, was not published due to the perceived sensitivity. Therefore, the 1971 census information on religion was the first published.

⁴ In India, according to the 2000 census authority, Muslims numbered approximately 120 million, or 12% of the 1 billion India's population (Mistry 200). However, Indonesia is not a Muslim-majority country, which is defined by Abbasi Shavazi and Jones (2005) as a country with Muslims constitute more than 50% of the total population. As a result, the largest Muslim-majority countries are Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Turkey and Egypt. India is a country where its large Muslim population in a minority.

⁵ Among "others", as discussed in Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta (2003) Hindus grew at 1.6%, and Buddhist grew at 1.5% for the period of 1971-2000. In percentage, Hindus declined from 1.9% in 1971 to 1.8% in 2000, and Buddhists declined from 0.9% to 0.8% for the respective year. Others declined in absolute number.

interesting question is that what are the reasons for the difference in the growth rate among religious groups? Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta (2003) argue here that the highest growth among the Christians is because of its natural growth, which is mostly attributable to the difference in fertility level among the religious groups. The discussion on this is developed further later in this paper.

Population Pyramid and Fertility


With regards to age and sex composition as presented in Figures 2 to 4, the Muslims have different composition than the Christians and others. Figure 2 indicates that the Muslims have experienced a shift in their population pyramid from its past. The base was no longer wide, even showed a decreasing number in each group of young people below 15. The pyramid of Muslims population in 2000, Figure 2, indicates a relatively older population than the Christians, Figure 3. The number of young Muslims population under 10 was 20.2%, and the older population, aged 60 and above, was 7.2% in 2000. This was a shift from 32.1% and 4.4% for the respective groups in 1971⁶ (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta 2003). In other words, the Muslims are facing age-structural transition from young to old. As argued by Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta its bell-shape population pyramid in 2000 indicates the Muslims have experienced rapid decline in fertility and the decline has lasted for a relatively long time.

The proportion of young Christians accounted for 21.8% in 2000, a decrease from 32.0% in 1971, while the older persons accounted for 6.1% in 2000, an increase from 4.3% in 1971. The wide base of the Christian population pyramid in 2000 as shown in Figure 3 indicates a relatively high fertility rate than the Muslims. Even if the fertility rate of Christians has been decreasing, there is a time lag effect on the presence of a decreasing number of young population.

In comparison with other religions, Figure 4, the Muslims' population pyramid was different, indicating a much younger population than others. Figure 4 shows young population accounting for 17.5% and older persons 9.3% in 2000. The shape of population pyramid of others indicates a faster declining fertility and the decline itself has occurred for a longer period than the Muslims. This indication is supported by the fact that the Hindus mostly live in Bali and fertility rate in Bali has been below replacement level since early 1990s. The vast majority of Buddhists are indeed ethnic Chinese who have had low fertility rate.


⁶ The young population is defined as those below 10 due to the age grouping of the 1971 population data in a ten-year interval.

Figure 2. Population Pyramid of Muslims: Indonesia, 2000 (in percentage)




Source: Calculated and drawn from the raw data of the 2000 population census

Figure 3. Population Pyramid of Christian: Indonesia, 2000 (in percentage)



Source: Calculated and drawn from the raw data of the 2000 population census

Figure 4. Population Pyramid of Other Religions: Indonesia, 2000 (in percentage)



Source: Calculated and drawn from the raw data of the 2000 population census

Ananta and Arifin (2008a) estimated total fertility rate (TFR) by religion from the same data set of the 2000 population census using the own-children method. Their estimated TFRs support the indication presented in all the population pyramids. The Christians still had a high fertility, with TFR standing at 2.71, the highest among religious groups. Meanwhile the fertility rate of the Muslims was lower (2.32) than the Christians. Other religious group was even much lower than replacement rate of 2.1; that was 1.98. Ananta and Arifin (2008a) also calculated that the life expectancy at birth from the same census for different religious groups. Their findings are the life expectancy at birth for Muslim women and men was 66.6 years and 62.8 years, respectively. These were just about the same as the rates for all Indonesians, regardless their religions, which was 66.7 for women and 62.8 for men.

The expectancy of life at birth for the Muslims was the lowest compared with the Christians and others. The corresponding figure for Christian women and men respectively was one year longer, precisely it was 67.7 for women and 63.8 for men. Others even have the longest life expectancy at birth: 69.6 for women and 65.6 for men.

The shift from high to low rates of fertility and mortality has changed the age structure of Indonesia's population. Population ageing, measured by the percentage of population aged 60 and over to the total population, in Indonesia is rapidly ageing. The giant archipelago has been experiencing unprecedented growth of older persons. Their number grew rapidly with 3.2% annually in 1971-2000, or an increase from 5.3 million in 1971 to 14.4 million in 2000. The older Muslims even grew faster with 3.6% annually for the same period, or in absolute an increase from 4.5 million to 12.8 million for the respective year. The over 60s Muslims accounted for 4.4% of the 1971 Muslim population, increased to 7.2% in 2000.

Indonesia as the fourth most populous country in the world after China, India, and the United States, and comprising more than 13,000 islands, is the largest and most populous country in Southeast Asia. The archipelago is also the largest economy in the region. Its GDP formed about one third of total GDP in Southeast Asia in 2007, but its per capita GDP was the fifth largest in the region, with per capita GPD at below US\$2,000, compared with that of Singapore at US\$35,206 and of Malaysia at US\$6,880 in 2007. In other words, Indonesia is facing an ageing population at relatively low per capita income. Indonesia will become old before it gets rich. At the same time, it faces a large number of older persons which may hold many implications for health services and social security system.

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, fertility rate in the predominantly Muslim Indonesia has been declining rapidly. Among other things else, the strong support of the government in family planning programs was one of the most important factors. Muslims have been seen playing a heavier weight in family planning program and fertility decline in Indonesia. Decisions had been made within Muslim communities as part of a group process, to give a strong support to the family planning programs.

Table 2 provides another measure of fertility, which is measured by the number of children ever born (CEB) among ever married women aged 15 and above. It is expressed by the mean of children ever born and percentage distribution of ever married women by the number of children ever born classified into 4 groups: childless, 1-2 children, 3-5 children and more than 5 children. This table suggests a consistent fact that Muslims women have smaller number of CEB than the Christians, and larger than that of Others. The average number of CEB for Muslims aged 15 and above was 2.95 as compared with 3.18 for the Christians and 2.91 for Others. In all religious groups, the highest proportion of women seen among those with 1-2 children with the percentage ranging from 37.8% among the Christians, 42.6% among the Muslims, and 43.5% among Others. As expected, the percentage of Christian women having more than 6 children was the highest.

Table 2. Children Ever Born of the Ever Married Women Aged 15 and Above by Religion: Indonesia, 2000

Religion	Percentage Distribution of Women by CEB				Total	Mean of CEB
	0	1-2	3-5	6+		
Muslims	10.05	42.61	33.46	13.88	100.00	2.95
Christians	9.14	37.81	36.94	16.11	100.00	3.18
Others	8.60	43.52	36.05	11.82	100.00	2.91
Total	9.94	42.25	33.82	14.00	100.00	2.97

Source: Author's calculation from the raw data of the 2000 population census.

Table 3. CEB of Ever Married Muslim Women by Background Variables by Religion: Indonesia, 2000

	Children Ever Born (CEB)				Total	Mean CEB
	0	1-2	3-5	6+		
Education						
Primary School or Less	8.78	38.06	36.16	17.00	100.00	3.25
Junior High School	13.65	53.85	26.38	6.12	100.00	2.19
Senior High School	13.74	58.09	24.51	3.65	100.00	1.98
Tertiary Education	14.71	57.05	25.97	2.27	100.00	1.92
Activity						
Working	9.83	41.51	34.75	13.92	100.00	2.98
Looking for job	20.87	48.67	22.73	7.73	100.00	2.11
Not Labour Force	10.02	43.94	32.03	14.01	100.00	2.94
Main industry						
Agriculture	8.33	39.06	36.67	15.94	100.00	3.18
Manufacturing	16.87	50.42	25.05	7.67	100.00	2.21
Services	10.59	43.14	33.87	12.40	100.00	2.86
Age						
15-29	20.33	68.96	10.00	0.71	100.00	1.31
30-49	5.09	37.78	45.11	12.02	100.00	3.18
50-69	6.45	21.01	40.13	32.41	100.00	4.44
70+	9.75	22.54	35.32	32.39	100.00	4.33

Source: Arifin (2009).

Table 3 is cited from Arifin (2009) providing further analysis of socio-demographic correlates of the number of CEB among the Muslims only. It takes into account the effect of age of the ever married women, educational attainment, the activity in the labour market and industrial sector of the worker Muslim women. Taking into account the age differential, which is divided into four groups: young reproductive age of 15-29, old reproductive age of 30-49, pre and young elderly women of 50-69, and the oldest old women of 70 years and above, the mean number of CEB was higher for the older groups, ranging from 1.3 for the youngest Muslim women to 4.3 for the oldest Muslim women. Yet, the largest number of CEB was 4.4 for Muslims women aged 50-69, who were the generation giving births to the baby boomer generation. They were born in between 1930 and 1950 when Indonesia was not yet independent, colonized mainly by the Dutch, and early period of its independence of 1945. They faced various difficult situations during their reproductive period. Assuming their early marriage, they mainly started to give a birth as early as in 1945 until the New Order under Suharto. Many of them gave births under a pro-natalist policy. It is not surprising that about one third of this group had a big family with more than six children. Norm of a big family was also seen among the oldest women. Yet, the childless women were quite significant among those aged 70 and above with one in ten women. As voluntary childlessness is rare in developing countries like Indonesia, the percentage of women who have never had children provides an indicator of the level of primary infertility.

Norm of a small family is quite common among the young reproductive Muslim women with nearly seven in ten had "stopped" at two children. Meanwhile, childless Muslim women seem to be an emerging trend with one fifth of the childless is seen among young reproductive Muslim women. This may reflect delayed first-born baby or intended childless at all.

This emerging trend of childless Muslim women is possibly related to the educational level of Muslim women. As expected, Table 3 shows that the percentage of childless Muslim women was higher among the higher educational level. In the meantime, measured by the mean number of CEB, their family size of Muslims declines as their educational level of the women increases. Those completed senior high school have less than 2 children.

Economic activity provides assurance to build a family with children. Among working Muslim women, 13.9% had big family with more than six children. Yet, among unemployed, about one fifth was childless, as compared with about 10% of childless among working women. Furthermore, taking into account the employment sector, a big family is still seen among Muslims working in agricultural sector. It may indicate children as source of labour force for this sector. The percentage of big family size is also seen among Muslim women working in service sector, but a significantly smaller percentage of big family is seen among Muslim women working in manufacturing. The nature of the working arrangement in these two sectors may play a role in controlling the number of CEB.

In summary, the relatively very low fertility and mortality among the majority Muslims has also raised concern about ageing in Indonesia. Rahardjo et al. (2009), for example, has raised the issue of the financial implication of the rapidly ageing population Indonesia. However, the seriousness and attention of the policy makers and society at large, at both the national and regional levels, on ageing issues have not been as high as that given to family planning and National Family Planning Coordinating Board (BKKBN) in the early 1970s. In 2004, the government established National Commission for Older Persons (Komnas Lansia) and yet the establishment of regional commissions is still in progress. Yet, at the same time, we may see a favourable condition for economic and social development when an increasing older persons is accompanied by a larger increase in working age population.

Geographical Distribution

Islam has the largest followers in Indonesia as a whole, but geographically Muslim is not the majority in few provinces. Table 4 provides trend in size, concentration and geographical distribution of Muslims in Indonesia for nearly three decades from 1971 to 2000. Within this period, as previously mentioned, Indonesia has experienced tremendous changes including the implementation of regional autonomy in 2001, which resulted in the creation of new provinces from the "old" provinces. For example, West Java was split into two provinces, namely, Banten and West Java, in 2000. The number of Indonesian provinces was 30 in 2000, increased from 27. In 2009, there were 33 provinces. With this background, the regional analysis over time should be done carefully.

As of 2000 figure, the number of Muslims across provinces ranged from as small as of about 323 thousand in Bali to as big as of about 34.9 million in West Java. The geographical distribution of Muslims by province has changed during 1971-2000 period. Outside Java islands are inhabited by more Muslims than before as the proportion of the Muslims in Java island declined from 67% in 1971 to 63% in 2000.

As seen in Table 4, in 1971, the largest number of Muslims resided in East Java, while in 2000 the largest number resided in West Java. This shift reflects the relatively lower and faster decline in fertility rate in East Java, compared with West Java. In both provinces, there were about 97% Muslims respectively. In East Java, the percentage of Muslims even increased slightly from 96.9% in 1971 to 97.1% in 2000. Apart from relatively lower fertility in the recent period, its historical background may explain why Muslim Indonesia predominantly lived in East Java. Historically, East Java population is always large. At the end of the Hindu Kingdom of Majapahit

in East Java, a major development occurred when the king was converted and Islam's influence grew from the fifteenth century onwards.

Table 4. Trends in Geographical Distribution and Concentration of Muslims in Indonesia: 1971-2000

Province	Muslims		Annual Growth Rate	Percentage of Muslims		Geographical Distribution	
	1971	2000	1971-2000	1971	2000	1971	2000
Indonesia	103,581,467	177,528,772	1.86	87.51	88.22	100.00	100.00
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	1,948,152	1,687,835**	-0.49**	97.00	97.30	1.88	0.95
North Sumatra	3,989,427	7,530,839	2.19	60.26	65.45	3.85	4.24
West Sumatra	2,755,747	4,147,436	1.41	98.69	97.78	2.66	2.34
Riau	1,369,375	4,214,294	3.88	83.44	88.63	1.32	2.37
Jambi	977,699	2,314,505	2.97	97.22	96.15	0.94	1.30
South Sumatra*	3,238,189	-	-	94.19	-	3.13	-
South Sumatra	-	6,648,069	-	-	96.95	-	3.74
Bangka Belitung	-	781,992	-	-	86.98	-	0.44
Bengkulu	505,861	1,523,187	3.80	97.41	97.51	0.49	0.86
Lampung	2,620,646	6,357,604	3.06	94.41	95.61	2.53	3.58
Jakarta	3,830,735	7,157,182	2.16	84.26	85.74	3.70	4.03
West Java*	21,136,942	-	-	97.76	-	20.41	-
West Java	-	34,884,417	-	-	97.65	-	19.65
Banten	-	7,746,781	-	-	95.68	-	4.36
Central Java	21,087,172	29,942,066	1.21	96.44	96.82	20.36	16.87
Yogyakarta	2,325,812	2,863,751	0.72	93.46	91.77	2.25	1.61
East Java	24,722,099	33,747,695	1.07	96.92	97.07	23.87	19.01
Bali	108,414	323,853	3.77	5.11	10.29	0.10	0.18
West Nusa Tenggara	2,100,054	3,699,018	1.94	95.76	96.57	2.04	2.08
East Nusa Tenggara	192,401	335,005	1.91	8.38	8.80	0.19	0.19
West Kalimantan	862,723	2,151,056	3.15	42.71	57.62	0.83	1.21
Central Kalimantan	383,793	1,335,290	4.30	54.68	74.14	0.37	0.75
South Kalimantan	1,635,146	2,888,001	1.96	96.24	97.05	1.58	1.63
East Kalimantan	500,726	2,077,428	4.91	68.44	85.02	0.48	1.17
North Sulawesi*	743,526	-	-	43.29	-	0.72	-
North Sulawesi	-	581,677	-	-	29.48	-	0.33
Gorontalo	-	814,836	-	-	98.15	-	0.46
Central Sulawesi	661,083	1,577,511	3.00	72.36	78.39	0.64	0.89
South Sulawesi	4,597,329	6,959,472	1.43	88.75	89.20	4.44	3.92
Southeast Sulawesi	699,962	1,692,644	3.04	98.02	95.29	0.68	0.95
Maluku*	543,400	-	-	49.88	-	0.52	-
Maluku	-	564,035	-	-	49.05	-	0.32
North Maluku	-	571,062	-	-	85.25	-	0.32
Irian Jaya	33,083	410,231	8.68	21.94	24.16	0.03	0.23

Note: * These provinces are divided into two provinces in 2000. ** The number was highly underestimated due to inability in enumerating more than a half of the total population in this province as the province was still under conflict.

Source: Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta (2003).

Apart from these two provinces, there are many other provinces where their populations are exclusively Muslim. Except in Jakarta, in all provinces in Java island, the most densely island,

Muslims accounted for more than 95% of the population in each province. In the islands east to Java, provinces with exclusively Muslim population are West Nusa Tenggara, Southeast Sulawesi and Gorontalo. Meanwhile, in the islands west to Java, Sumatra Island has many exclusive provinces of Muslims, such as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, West Sumatra, Jambi, South Sumatra, Bengkulu and Lampung.

Other provinces not located in Java and Sumatra have Muslims as the majority while few provinces have the Muslims as the minority. In the province of Bali, Hindus are the majority, forming 87.4% in 2000, in contrast with the Muslims of 10.3%. In the province of East Nusa Tenggara, the Christians accounted for 87.7%, in contrast with the Muslims of 8.8% only. Other provinces with the Muslims as the minority are Papua (Christians form 75.5% and Muslims 24.2%), North Sulawesi (Christians form 69.3% and Muslims 29.5%), and Maluku (Christians form 50.2% and Muslims 49.1%). There is no province having Buddhism or Confucianism as the majority.

As previously mentioned, although many provinces are exclusively Muslims they are not necessarily Sharia-based provinces. Aceh is the only province in Indonesia where the central Government specifically authorized Shari'a. Law no 18/2001 granted Aceh special autonomy and established a system of Shari'a. Before it could take effect, the law required the provincial legislature to approve local regulations ("qanun") incorporating Shari'a precepts into the legal code. The 2001 Law states the Shari'a courts which only apply to Muslims. Aceh is the only province that has Shari'a courts. Some human rights and women's rights activists complained that implementation of Shari'a has been focused on superficial issues, such as proper Islamic dress, while ignoring deep-seated moral and social problems, such as corruption. However, though Aceh is the only province implementing shariah law, several districts in the province of South Sulawesi in eastern Indonesia have enforced the shari'a by-laws. South Sulawesi has even the highest number of districts that have adopted shari'a-inspired by-laws (Buehler 2008). One of the districts is Bulukumba regency adopting a regulation in 2003 which made it mandatory for schoolgirls to wear a headscarf. The regent of this district also adopted a by-law requiring students and schoolchildren to be able to read the Qur'an to 'a satisfactory level' if they wanted to pass their final exams (Buehler 2008).

Within three decades, the percentage of Muslims to the total population in many provinces increased. Particularly, the increase was very high among provinces in Kalimantan. For example, the percentage of Muslim to the total population of Central Kalimantan increased from 42.7% in 1971 to 74.1% in 2000. In East Kalimantan, it increased from 68.4% to 85.0%, respectively. Although the Muslims were less dominant in West Kalimantan, its percentage to the province population increased significantly from 42.7% in 1971 to 57.6% in 2000. South Kalimantan is the only province of Kalimantan inhabited by exclusively Muslims, with the percentage of Muslims slightly increasing from 96.2% in 1971 to 97.1% in 2000—the annual

growth rate of Muslims was only 1.96% for that period of time. This is in contrast to the three provinces of Kalimantan where the Muslim population grew very fast for the same period. Muslims in West Kalimantan grew 3.2% annually in 1971-2000, faster than that of Central Kalimantan with 4.3% annually, and even fastest in East Kalimantan with 4.9% annually for the same period. The Muslims in these provinces grew much faster than the overall Muslims in Indonesia.

The slowest growth rate of Muslims was seen in Yogyakarta with 0.7% annually between 1971 and 2000. Yogyakarta has been below replacement level since 1990s. Meanwhile, this province is also known as a "student" province where a significant influx of students came to this province. On the other extreme, Papua has seen the fastest growth of Muslim population with 8.7% annually in 1971-2000, though Papua is still a province with Christian majority.

How did the religious composition change? Although there are some other factors such as conversion among religions, rapid demographic transition involving changes in fertility rate, mortality rate and migration are likely to have more contribution to the changes in religious composition.

In addition, geographically the Christians mostly lived in provinces where fertility rate was relatively high. More than a half of the Christians lived in the provinces of North Sumatra, East Nusa Tenggara, Papua and West Kalimantan, where the families have on average around three children. North Sumatra's TFR was 2.78 for the period of 1996-99, East Nusa Tenggara's TFR was 3.09 for the same period; Papua's TFR 3.0; and West Kalimantan's TFR 2.75 (Badan Pusat Statistik, 2001). Most lived in the provinces where the family planning program started the latest. However, the popularly known Christians province of North Sulawesi is an exception. The province had a low fertility rate (TFR = 1.99), and yet it was a home to only 7.6% of the Christians in Indonesia. This province is also known as one of the few provinces where the national family planning program started at the second phase after Java-Bali. On the other hand, most of the Indonesian Muslims lived in the most populous island of Java, where the government controlled family planning program initially started in the Island and as previously discussed many provinces in this island have reached and been approaching below replacement level. West Java's TFR was 2.51, East Java's TFR 1.71, and Central Java 2.06 in 1995-99.

It is important to note that migration can play an important role in changing the religious composition at the provincial level. Internal migration has altered the demographic makeup of the country over the past three decades. The discussion on internal and international migration of Indonesians is discussed later in this paper. The percentage of Muslims among the total population of the province of Yogyakarta declined from 93.5% in 1971 to 91.8% in 2000. Students coming to Yogyakarta, particularly from provinces with high percentage of Christians, may explain the decline. In the province of Bali, the Hindus formed 93.3% of the population in 1971, declining to 87.4% in 2000. Migration from other parts of Indonesia, particularly from the

mostly Muslim provinces, may have contributed to the decline in the percentage of Hindus in Bali. In Maluku (before being split into Maluku and North Maluku) the concentration of Muslims rose from 52.0% in 1971 to 64.0% in 2000. The large increase was mainly because of migrants from the island of Java and other provinces with a lot of Muslim population.

In addition, many separations of one administrative area into two or more administrative areas are to an extent a result of the regional autonomy program started in 2001. These separations are partly based on ethnic and religious lines. For examples, the province of North Sulawesi was split into two provinces. It became the provinces of Gorontalo, an exclusively home for Muslims, and the province of North Sulawesi, where Christians contributed to nearly 70.0% of the province population in 2000. The province of Maluku was also split into two: North Maluku and Maluku. Previously, Maluku was a home for Muslims and Non-muslims in an even proportion. After the split, the province of North Maluku is dominantly Muslims (85.3 percent of its population). The province Maluku maintained the almost even percentages between the Christians and Muslims. Perhaps, separations based on religious and ethnic lines should be re-examined.

Migration

Migration is a nature of Indonesian mobility. This section assesses the trend of migration of Indonesians in general, which indirectly reflects the migration of the Muslim. Yet, I make an effort to specifically analyse the migration of the Muslims from the raw data of the 2000 population census as later discussed in this section. The following paragraphs discuss the internal recent migration of Indonesians, regardless their religious affiliation, measured by the recent migration derived from a number of surveys and censuses publications.

Based on the data presented at Table 5, by comparing in- and out-recent migrants, migration within five years before the survey, at the provincial level, there are four patterns of changes and continuity on the pattern of inter-provincial migration, between sending and receiving provinces (Ananta and Arifin, 2008a). The first pattern is the shift from receiving to sending provinces such as the provinces of Lampung, Jakarta, Central Kalimantan, Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, and Maluku. The province of Lampung in Sumatra island, which used to be the main destination of transmigration for the predominantly Muslim Javanese was already saturated and no longer a point of transmigration destination. In the period of 1995-2000, there were slightly more out-migrants than in-migrant to Lampung. People left Lampung to the neighbouring province in the Island, i.e. South Sumatra, and the closest provinces in Java, especially Banten and West Java, which are Muslim-majority provinces. Jakarta, a multi-religious

capital city, was the main destination for migrants to settle in from all provinces in the country. The population of Jakarta migrated out mostly to the surrounding provinces, West Java and Banten, and commuted to Jakarta for work.

Table 5. Recent Inter-Provincial In- and Out-Recent Migrants: Indonesia, 1975 - 2005 (in thousands)

Province	In-migrants				Out-migrants			
	1975-1980 ^a	1985-1990 ^a	1995-2000 ^b	2000-2005 ^c	1975-1980 ^a	1985-1990 ^a	1995-2000 ^b	2000-2005 ^c
Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	51.2	56.3	15.4	na	28.2	49.4	161.6	na
North Sumatera	95.6	107.9	139.9	107.3	177.3	277.6	358.5	201.9
West Sumatera	93.1	129.0	109.0	108.3	153.2	173.2	233.9	128.8
Riau	98.7	245.5	526.7	213.9	53.8	92.9	91.3	98.8
Jambi	107.3	136.4	109.5	66.3	36.2	64.0	83.3	51.4
South Sumatera	221.2	212.2	163.3	66.0	132.0	198.8	152.0	106.8
Bangka Belitung	-	-	36.5	19.9	-	-	33.8	17.8
Bengkulu	66.9	82.8	68.8	32.7	15.9	28.6	35.8	30.0
Lampung	507.8	212.3	149.0	91.9	45.6	135.9	149.3	110.9
Riau Archipelago	-	-	-	154.3	-	-	-	8.6
Jakarta	766.4	833.0	702.2	575.2	382.3	993.4	850.3	734.6
West Java	552.0	1,350.6	1,097.0	730.9	468.4	495.7	631.8	443.0
Banten	-	-	620.3	290.9	-	-	207.4	132.9
Central Java	183.8	384.8	354.2	327.6	908.3	1,159.7	1,017.5	662.2
Yogyakarta	98.9	161.7	196.6	189.9	72.9	120.8	129.5	87.7
East Java	203.2	328.6	186.0	250.2	570.6	647.3	529.0	344.3
Bali	37.3	66.0	87.2	76.6	52.4	56.1	47.4	39.0
West Nusa Tenggara	26.2	37.4	60.0	26.9	39.0	36.9	50.7	32.3
East Nusa Tenggara	26.0	27.1	69.9	33.3	34.7	45.6	55.0	30.2
West Kalimantan	39.4	43.8	49.2	16.4	28.4	44.7	45.7	33.0
Central Kalimantan	49.7	78.8	124.4	31.5	16.0	37.0	24.9	47.3
South Kalimantan	61.7	98.3	89.3	62.6	46.1	76.4	62.6	41.8
East Kalimantan	112.6	194.5	155.5	149.3	20.3	68.2	42.8	47.5
North Sulawesi	45.5	34.7	54.5	28.9	38.3	51.3	38.8	31.8
Gorontalo	-	-	9.3	11.1	-	-	33.4	15.6
Central Sulawesi	83.6	70.0	75.3	52.3	17.3	28.0	30.6	27.5
South Sulawesi	65.2	119.5	79.8	103.2	147.9	161.1	169.7	139.3
Southeast Sulawesi	51.0	71.1	110.3	40.7	29.6	36.7	22.3	30.7
Maluku	46.9	68.7	18.7	9.6	27.0	38.9	92.8	30.4
North Maluku	-	-	14.8	10.4	-	-	28.5	16.5
Papua	33.4	73.8	63.8	51.6	16.2	31.6	30.2	33.9
Total	3,724.6	5,224.8	5,536.3	3,929.6	3,557.9	5,149.8	5,440.2	3,756.3

Source: a. Compiled from Muhidin (2002), Table 2.21.

b. Compiled and calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik, (2001), Table 12a.9.

c. Compiled and calculated from Badan Pusat Statistik (2006b).

The out migrants from Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, known as Veranda Mecca, numbered slightly more than ten times as that of in-migrants in the period of 1995-2000. The conflict in Aceh could probably be one of the reasons for leaving this province. Some of them moved out to the neighbouring provinces of dominated Christians of North Sumatra, Majority Muslims of

Riau, Bengkulu, South Sumatra and West Java. All these provinces received more than 10 thousands migrants from Aceh. With the peace and reconstruction program since 2005, it is highly likely that the pattern of migration has reversed again, with much more in-migration to than out-migration from Aceh.

The most violent conflict between ethnic groups of Muslim Madurese and non-Muslim Dayak in March 2001 can be an explanation for the shift from migrant-receiving to migrant-sending province of Central Kalimantan. The killing was brutal. The fears to be victimised sent many Madurese back to East Java or migrated out from this province and made them internally displaced persons. Virtually there is no more Madurese in the province as they fled to escape from the violence.

Maluku is another province experiencing inter-communal violent conflicts and shifting from a migrant-receiving province to a migrant-sending province. However, the nature of the conflicts was different from that in Central Kalimantan. It was between religious groups. In the past, Maluku was well-known as the Spice Islands, which a home to nearly fifty-fifty of the population embracing Islam and non-Islam. Ambon, the capital city of the province, is the home for the Ambonese who profess Christianity. Meanwhile the northern part of Maluku was dominated by the Muslims, and was broken off to form a new province, North Maluku, in 1999. It has increased the percentage of Muslims in formerly predominantly Christian eastern parts of the country. By the early 1990s, Christians became a minority for the first time in some areas of the Moluccas. While government-sponsored transmigration from heavily populated Java and Madura to less populated areas contributed to the increase in the Muslim population in the resettlement areas, no evidence suggests that the Government intended to create a Muslim majority in Christian areas, and most Muslim migration seemed spontaneous.

The second pattern is the shift from a migrant-sending to a migrant-receiving province. Bali, West Nusa Tenggara, and East Nusa Tenggara, which are archipelagic provinces in the east to Java with each has a particular religious domination. Migrants to Bali were mostly originated from East Java, the closest province to the West, followed by those from Jakarta, Central Java and West Nusa Tenggara. Many migrants to an exclusively Muslim province of West Nusa Tenggara also came from the closest province, Bali. An interesting thing is in East Nusa Tenggara. More than half of the migrants to this Christian dominant province in the five years before the 2000 came from abroad; they were probably the returning overseas workers.

The third pattern is the continuity of being migrant-sending provinces, namely, Christians dominated province of North Sumatra, Muslim dominated provinces of West Sumatra and South Sulawesi continue to be migrant-sending provinces. These three provinces are well-known as the home-provinces of the highly mobile ethnic groups—ethnic groups who place merantau (“migrating out”) as desirable behaviour. North Sumatra is the home for the Batak who are mainly Christian; West Sumatra, for the Minangkabau of the matrilineal Muslim ethnic group; and

South Sulawesi, for the Buginese and Makassarese who are mainly Muslim. Historically, these two ethnic groups were animists in which by 1611 the kingdoms of Bugis and Makassar had converted to Islam.

The provinces of Central Java, and East Java—the home provinces of the Javanese Muslims—were also sending-migrant provinces. Unlike the Minang, Batak, Buginese, and Makassarese, the Javanese were not known as “merantau” ethnic group. On contrary, they were better known as those who believe on “mangan ora mangan pokoke kumpul” (eating or not eating, the most important thing is being together). Yet, they have always been more migration out of these provinces than migration into these provinces. The Javanese played a significant contribution with at least 2% of the total population in each of the provinces (Suryadinata, Arifin and Ananta, 2003). The Madurese, known to be a mobile ethnic group and mostly Muslim, who lived mostly in the island of Madura, East Java, may also contribute the relatively high percentage of out-migrants from East Java. However, as mentioned earlier, many Madurese returned to East Java or other provinces in the beginning 2000s. The newly opened bridge of Suramadu on 10 June 2009 connecting the Madura and Java will facilitate the moves of the Madurese and others.

North Maluku with 85% Muslims seemed to have been a migrant-sending province since its establishment in 1999. Interestingly, in the period of 1995-2000, Christian-majority of North Sulawesi was the major destination for the North Malucans. Migrants out from North Maluku to North Sulawesi accounted for 45.8% of the total out-migrants. In the later period, they moved a bit farther, to the Muslim-predominant of East Java, the main destination with 31.1% of the total out-migrants. Meanwhile, 23.2% of the out migrants remained migrating to North Sulawesi.

Another province considered as a migrant-sending province was Gorontalo, separated from North Sulawesi in 2000. Like the case of North Maluku, Gorontalo was dominated by the Muslim. North Sulawesi was dominated by the Christians. Because of this separation, many out-migrants moved into North Sulawesi with a declining trend from 12.7 thousand persons in 1995-2000 to 7.4 thousand persons in 2000-2005. On the other hand, as seen in Table 5, Gorontalo has been attracting many more migrants to live in.

Twelve provinces show the fourth pattern, the continuity of being migrant-receiving provinces. These provinces are Riau, Jambi, Bangka Belitung, Bengkulu, West Java, Banten, Yogyakarta, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi and Papua. Each has its own attractiveness. All of them are predominantly Muslim provinces.

Regardless of its intent, the economic and political consequences of the transmigration policy contributed to religious conflicts in Maluku, Central Sulawesi, and to a lesser extent in Papua. In particular, an influx of Muslim migrants, initially sponsored by the government, has changed demographics in the region, with Papuan Christians now fearing they will become a minority. The city of Manokwari in West Papua, officially declared itself a “Gospel City” (Kota

Injil) in March 2007 (Adeney-Risakotta, 2008). Church leaders in the city passed the controversial law that ensures Christians obey the teachings of the Bible and non-Christians do not offend the Christian majority. In Manokwari the local government refused permission to build a large mosque or open an Islamic Center with the reason that it conflicted with Manokwari's identity as a Gospel City. This was a reaction to the fact that Christians have difficulty getting permission to build churches in many parts of Indonesia, Adeney-Risakotta further argued that these Manokwari Christians are not representative of the majority of Christians in Indonesia or even in West Papua. The declaration of a "Gospel City" is an isolated occurrence not a widespread political movement. Nevertheless, they represent one kind of Christian response to the political realities of the majority Muslim Indonesia. In a nutshell, Indonesians regardless their religion have internally migrated voluntarily and involuntarily across provinces.

Taking into account their religion, who are more likely to migrate? The following discussion will presents the more specific internal migration within Indonesia using smaller geographical boundary than the province, as discussed earlier, to define a migrant. A new feature of the 2000 population census than previous ones lies on the questions related to migration. The census asks which district (*kabupaten/kotamadya*) one lived 5 years before the census. Comparing the current district of residence and the residence 5 years before the census, we will be able to define whether an individual is a migrant or not. Therefore, a migrant is defined if the individual's district of residence in the time of census (in 2000) different from the district 5 years ago. Therefore, this recent migration refers to the period of 1995-2000. Important note is that the phenomenon of migration presented here is limited to population aged 15 and above as the analysis is linked to the economic activities and employment.

The result is the migrants aged 15 and above numbered 8.9 million in the 1995-2000, or 6.4% of the total population aged 15 and above. They consisted of 86.3% Muslims, 11.1% Christians and 2.6% others. Considering religious difference, the migration rate of the Christians was higher than the Muslims, that was 8.2% vis-à-vis 6.3%. Others was 5.6%. In other words, the Muslims are less likely to migrate than the Christians. Its impact is felt more due to their difference in size; 7.7 million Muslims in 2000 lived in different district as in 1995 and almost 1.0 million Christians in 2000 lived in different district 5 years ago.

Migration is age-sensitive in which young people are more likely to migrate. Table 6 and Figure 5 show the pattern of migration rate by age, that the migration rate increases at the young age and reaches its peak at the age of 20-24 and since then the rate declines until the age of 80-84 and it slightly increases at the age 85 and above. This increase deserves further research whether the oldest old migrated to co-reside with their children to seek for care givers. Young people in their late teens and twenties move for education and employment. They also leave home, form relationship, and start families.

Table 6. Gender-Specific Pattern of Muslims' Migration Rate by Background Characteristics: Indonesia, 1995-2000

Background Characteristics	Total	Male	Female
Population 15 and above	6.40	6.60	6.20
Muslims	6.25	6.46	6.04
Education			
Primary School or Less	4.01	4.01	4.01
Junior High School	7.60	7.33	7.91
Senior High School	11.60	11.41	11.86
Tertiary Education	14.00	14.35	13.52
Age Group			
15-19	6.73	5.93	7.54
20-24	10.48	10.34	10.61
25-29	8.60	9.23	7.99
30-34	7.12	8.04	6.20
35-39	5.41	6.17	4.65
40-44	4.36	4.86	3.82
45-49	3.88	4.20	3.51
50-54	3.43	3.73	3.11
55-59	3.07	3.32	2.82
60-64	2.67	2.86	2.49
65-69	2.46	2.59	2.36
70-74	2.41	2.52	2.32
75-79	2.45	2.54	2.37
80-84	2.43	2.50	2.37
85+	3.02	3.17	2.92
Activities			
Working	6.50	6.61	6.33
Looking for job	5.12	4.93	5.36
Not Labour Force	5.85	6.10	5.75
Main Industry of Workers			
Agriculture	3.60	3.72	3.43
Manufacturing	12.41	12.14	12.83
Services	8.35	8.48	8.16


Source: Arifin (2009).

Taking into account the highest educational attainment of the Muslims, it shows that the higher the educational level, the higher is the migration rate. This indicates that the more educated Muslims have a higher probability to migrate for either further educational reasons, or for employment. Perhaps, holding higher educational certificate means wider job opportunity for Muslims across districts within Indonesia and perhaps the same pattern is observed among the non-muslims. As seen in Table 6, the migration rate of Muslims with tertiary education is more than three times of Muslims with primary education or lower.

The propensity to migrate is the highest among the workers, with 6.5% of working Muslims experienced migration in the preceding five years. The rate is lower among job seekers. A deeper analysis among the Muslims workers indicates that their migration rate is the highest

for those working in the manufacturing sectors. This is in contrast to those working in agricultural sectors, where they are the least likely to migrate.

Figure 5. Age-Sex Pattern of Migration Rate of the Muslims: Indonesia, 1995-2000



Source: Drawn from Table 6.

Migration pattern differs slightly by gender. Table 6 provides the migration rate of the Muslims by gender for all variables discussed above, and the data from this table and Figure 10 suggest that female Muslims are as free as the males in terms of internal migration within the country. For the case of Indonesia, being women in the majority Muslim country do not prevent them from experiencing migration within the country. For certain categories, for example, among manufacturing workers, the migration rate of the women is even slightly higher than the men, 12.8% versus 12.1%. Among those holding junior or senior high school certificates, the migration rate of the Muslim women is also slightly higher than the men. Figure 5 shows that young Muslim women aged 15-19 have significantly a higher migration rate than the Muslim men for the same age group. The same pattern is shown among the early twentieth but the gap of migration rate by gender is smaller. Feminisation of internal migration of the Muslims in Indonesia is seen among young generation. Further in this paper this phenomenon will also be seen for crossing national border migration. Young Indonesian Muslim ladies are moving around the globe seeking for their better life. Ananta and Arifin (2008a) conclude that in the past several decades internal mobility of Indonesians has changed significantly, becoming more complex, larger in size and more advanced.

Indonesians have been reaching the world quite recently, despite the debate in the past that migration to other countries was seen as a theoretical possibility, and was highly unlikely to

be implemented because of restrictions from destination countries (Tjan 1960). However, quite recently Indonesia has become one of the nine major global sending countries in Asia, namely Bangladesh, China, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand, to fill job opportunities in other countries for a limited period of contract. At the same time, more foreigners can be seen in Indonesia, not only as tourists, but also as workers or retirees seeking for the “final home”. However, the statistics on international migration from and to Indonesia is more difficult to find and rely on, because it involves many countries of destinations and origins (Ananta and Arifin 2007). The statistics on migration out from Indonesia relies heavily on those supplied by the Minister of Manpower, Republic of Indonesia. It reflects more issues related to unskilled workers rather than the skilled workers who are mostly unmonitored.

Despite many gloomy stories on overseas Indonesian workers, the annual number of workers sent abroad kept increasing, from 338,992 in 2001 to 646,548 in 2006. It declined to 593,024 in 2007 and 450,097 in 2008. One of the economic benefits of sending workers abroad can be seen from the remittances the workers sent back home. The amount of remittances from overseas workers was steadily increasing at below 1.0 billion in the 1980s and early 1990s, but it has been accelerating sharply in the late 1990s. The remittances sent to Indonesia were US\$1.2 billion per year between 1998 and 1999 and doubled to US\$2.5 billion in 2003. It then reached almost US\$3.0 billion in 2005, accelerated to US\$ 6.0 billion in 2007, and 6.6 billion in 2008.

The sharp increase in the number of Indonesian workers overseas is accompanied by a phenomenon of rising feminization of the workers. Most female overseas workers preferred to work in the Middle Eastern countries. However, around 1990, the destination countries for Indonesian female workers expanded to Southeast Asia and the Asia Pacific region. Women constituted the major portion of the Indonesian workers sent to Singapore, Brunei, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirate and Kuwait. The rising trend of female overseas workers was a response to the stronger global demand for workers to work in domestic and entertainment sectors, reflecting changing demographic and economic conditions in those countries. On the other hand, Indonesian males dominated the flows to South Korea and Japan under the so-called trainee programs in that country (Hugo, 2007), providing cheap labour to boost Japanese and Korean economies. In 2005, about 89.21 per cent of the workers sent to South Korea were male, an increase from 82.98 per cent in 2001.

The number of foreign workers residing in Indonesia dropped sharply from 25,713 in 2002 to 18,138 in 2003. In absolute term, the largest declines were seen in Jakarta and the neighbouring province of West Java—two provinces with the largest numbers of foreign workers in Indonesia. The October 2002 shocking suicide bomb in Bali, targeting Westerners, might have scared foreigners away from Indonesia in 2003. Nevertheless, some other suicide bombs occurring until 2005 did not seem to deter foreigners to work in Indonesia. Indeed, the number

has kept rising from 18,138 in 2003 to 16,902 in 2006. The rise is seen in all provinces. Few had fluctuating numbers with a rising trend.

Table 7. Foreign Workers by Citizenship: Indonesia, 2001-2004

	Country of Citizenship	Number				Percentage			
		2001	2002	2003	2004	2001	2002	2003	2004
1	America	2,465	2,476	1,606	1,580	10.14	9.63	8.85	7.90
2	Australia	2,258	2,500	1,533	1,614	9.28	9.72	8.45	8.07
3	Netherlands	541	494	350	344	2.22	1.92	1.93	1.72
4	Hong Kong	128	108	71	36	0.53	0.42	0.39	0.18
5	India	1,664	1,944	1,278	1,426	6.84	7.56	7.05	7.13
6	United Kingdom	2,209	2,392	1,367	1,354	9.08	9.30	7.54	6.77
7	Japan	3,700	3,640	2,644	3,451	15.21	14.16	14.58	17.25
8	German	560	534	479	539	2.30	2.08	2.64	2.69
9	South Korea	2,465	2,461	1,729	1,903	10.14	9.57	9.53	9.51
10	Canada	786	877	532	429	3.23	3.41	2.93	2.14
11	Malaysia	968	1,076	894	1,361	3.98	4.18	4.93	6.80
12	Thailand	253	275	230	376	1.04	1.07	1.27	1.88
13	France	684	782	516	460	2.81	3.04	2.84	2.30
14	Philippine	949	1,011	817	860	3.90	3.93	4.50	4.30
15	New Zealand	417	422	236	254	1.71	1.64	1.30	1.27
16	Singapore	570	646	509	578	2.34	2.51	2.81	2.89
17	Taiwan	1,090	1,056	677	750	4.48	4.11	3.73	3.75
18	China	1,030	1,303	1,167	1,340	4.24	5.07	6.43	6.70
	Others	1,582	1,716	1,503	1,353	6.51	6.67	8.29	6.76
	Total	24,319	25,713	18,138	20,008	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Source : Ananta and Arifin (2008b).

Foreign workers entering Indonesia are dominated by workers from East Asian countries in particular the Japanese and South Koreans (Table 7). The Japanese accounted for 15.2% of the total foreign workers staying in the country in 2001, and the percentage increased to 17.3% in 2004. Meanwhile, the percentage of South Koreans tended to decline from 10.1% in 2001 to 9.5% in 2004. Furthermore, the percentage of foreign workers from Asia as a whole rose from 52.7% in 2001 to 60.4% in 2004. On the other hand, the percentage of Western foreigners dropped. For example, the percentage of the US workers declined from 10.14% in 2001 to 7.90% in 2004; Australian foreigners, from 9.28% to 8.07%; and United Kingdom foreigners, from 9.08% to 6.77%. An exception is German. Though small, the percentage rose from 2.30% in 2001 to 2.69% in 2004.

In summary, the Indonesians, Muslims or non-Muslims, are facing a new challenge of the presence of foreign workers in the country. Among foreigners, Indonesia was considered dangerous in the beginning of this century when a series of bombing took places in several cities and local conflicts in several provinces.

Socio-economic Characteristics of the Muslim Indonesians

Education


Among other things, an important achievement of the government of Indonesia on the improvement of the general welfare of the population was a major improvement in education. The government has successfully reduced the number of illiterate population. The percentage of population aged 10 and above who were literate increased from 61% in 1971 to 84% in 1990 and further increased to 89% in 1997. This improvement is inline with the Article 31 of the 1945 Constitution which stipulates that (1) every citizen has the right to obtain education, and (2) the Government provides one national education. In the previous section, education has been used as one of the covariates of fertility. To better understand, the following discussion provides description of the education system in Indonesia.

The formal educational system in Indonesia starts from two years for kindergarten, followed by six years for Primary school, three years for Junior High school, three years for Senior High school, one to three years for diploma or four years for university degree. At the primary school, pupils normally go through six academic years and by the end of the Primary, six-year pupils will sit for the final examination. Those who pass the final examination will receive certificates to be used for the application to Junior High school. At Junior high school, pupils normally go through three years and continue to a further level, senior high school, for the same duration. Again, at each of the highest level of these schools, pupils will sit for the final examination. The Junior and Senior High schools consist of general and vocational schools.

In 1984, the Government of Indonesia took a major step and declared the first six years of education to be compulsory. Then, ten years later, in 1994, this six-year compulsory education was expanded to nine years. Therefore, every Indonesian should at least attend primary school and junior high school, although in some areas, not enough school places are available to make this a reality. For the non-formal system, there are two packages, Package A and Package B. Package A is similar to primary education and Package B is similar to Junior High School. The non-formal system is for school age children who cannot go to formal school and also for adults who did not go to school.

Taking into account religion, Figure 6 shows that the educational achievement varied across religious group with the majority Muslims finished primary school (62.5%), in contrast with the Christians who mainly finished above primary school (53.0%). Enjoying tertiary education is still a luxurious service for Muslims in Indonesia as only 3.4% could complete this higher level of education, in contrast with 7.8% among the Christians. With the ongoing globalization and liberalization of trade, the economic conditions of Muslims are expected to be lower since only highly skilled individuals are expected to survive in such an economy. Therefore, there is an urgent need to continue to narrow the gap.

Figure 6. Educational Attainment of Indonesians by Religion: Indonesia, 2000




Source: Author's calculation from the raw data of the 2000 population census.

Furthermore, Figure 7 focusing on Muslims only shows a starkly difference on educational level between the young and the old generations. Among the old generation, they were mostly primary school graduates or leavers and even some never studied and illiterate. Among the younger generation, they varied across educational levels. To some extent, the educational composition of the young generation indicates the levels of socio-economic strata of the society. Figure 7 also describes that the nine-year compulsory education declared in 1994 has showed the fruit which was seen by a jump of the percentage of those having completed junior high school between those aged 15-19 and 20-24 years old in 2000. Among the school children aged 15-19 years old, 40% completed junior high school. To some extent the compulsory education policy has also affected the older age groups (20-34), in which the proportion of those completed senior high school is higher than the group of 15-19. In other


words, it is a revolutionary policy which will have a larger impact on the future of Indonesian human capital.

Figure 7. Educational Composition of the Muslim by Age Group: Indonesia, 2000



Source: Arifin (2009).

Figure 8. Educational Composition of the Muslim by Age and Sex: Indonesia, 2000



Source: Arifin (2009).

Based on the fact presented in Figure 8, educational composition in every age group does not differ significantly between women and men, though there was a tendency that women had lower education than men for the older age group. The compulsory education really benefited young women especially for those below 25 years old. For instance, among those aged

15-19, in relative number, 12.0% of these women completed senior high school vis-à-vis 11.2 of the men. In absolute number, the former numbered 1.11 million and the later 0.05 million less. Interestingly, among those aged 20-24 the percentage of tertiary educated women was also higher than that of men, 3.2% compared with 2.5%, or 280 thousand women compared with 204 thousand men. The educational improvement may have further impact on other aspects such as their participation in the labour market and age at first marriage as they spend more time at school.

Labour Force Participation and Employment

Rapid transformation of the Indonesian labour market occurred during 1990-1996 (Feridhanusetyawan and AswicaHyono, 2001). This transformation was temporarily hit by the crisis in 1997-1998 but it was then back to its progress. The 2000 figure on labour market perhaps still carried the impact of the crisis. However, in two decades, 1980-2000, the labour force participation rate increased and age-specific pattern was slightly shifted upward for men, especially among older men. One of the characteristics of this transformation is a substantial growth of the female participation in the labour market in all age groups. The increase in female labour force participation rate is faster than that of males in the Muslim majority Indonesia. Table 8 shows that overall the labor force participation rate of population aged 15 and above in 2000 was 69.7%. They can be workers or job seekers. The table shows that Muslims had lower participation rate in the labour market than the Christians and others. The age-specific labour force participation rate forms an inverted-U shape for all religious groups. The difference was among those productive ages of 20 to 44 when the Muslims had lower rate than the Christians and others.

Table 8. Labour Force Participation Rate by Religion: Indonesia, 2000


	Working	Looking for job	LFPR
Muslims	65.68	3.57	69.24
Christians	69.40	3.29	72.69
Others	71.35	2.51	73.86
Total	66.17	3.51	69.68

Source: Author's calculation from the raw data of the 2000 population census.

Looking into more specific pattern, Figure 9 reveals the difference of age-specific pattern of the labour force participation rates for both male and female Muslims. The figure shows that

as in any other countries, female labour force participation rate is lower than that of the male. Overall, the labour force participation rate for Muslim women was 55.6% and the rate for men was 83%. Figure 8 shows that around 34% female Muslims aged 15-19 years old are active in the labour market. Their participation increases sharply among those aged 20-24, reached 57%. The rate steadily increases and reaches its peak of 67 at the age of 45-49, end of reproductive age, then their participation starts to decline as some of them face retirement age. Among the male, the youngest group has a quite similar rate to the female and the rate is then much higher for those aged 20-24 years. Participation in the labour force becomes nearly universal when the males reach 30-34 years of age. The rate is always above 90% until they reach 60 and starts to decline afterwards. This picture indicates that the females quit from the labour market earlier than the males. Yet, nearly one quarter of the female oldest old, aged 85 and above, remain actively involve in the labour market. Even a higher rate is seen among male oldest old. It should be noted that social security coverage in Indonesia is still very limited.

FIGURE 9
Age-Specific Labour Force Participation Rate of Muslims by Sex:
Indonesia, 2000



Source: Arifin (2009).

As mentioned earlier, given unavailability of comprehensive and reliable social security scheme in Indonesia, being unemployed is a luxury. There is very high incentive for the working age population to stay employed unless they have strong support from household members to afford to be unemployed.⁷ Therefore, unemployment is an important and interesting issue in the

⁷ In the census and surveys, being employed is simply defined as working at least one hour in the preceding one week before the censuses or surveys.

country like Indonesia. The unemployment rate tends to be lower than that of developed countries which provide comprehensive and reliable social security.

With this condition, the unemployed, people who are not working and are actively looking for job, in Indonesia do not necessarily come from poor families since they can afford to wait for a job that fulfills their expectations. Furthermore, it is also possible that they are relatively educated, thus have high wage reservations and prefer to wait for the high paying job or suitable and satisfying job. Unemployment rate among primary school educated Muslims was 2.2 percent, in contrast to the rate among tertiary educated of 5.9 percent. Generally, it was 3.6 percent unemployment rate of the Muslim, with men had higher rate than the average. It should be noted, among women, there were many of them who can afford to be out of the labour force.

Indonesian economy is in transition, moving from an agricultural-based economy to another one, a service-based economy. Meanwhile, the employment among its Muslim population is still slightly higher in agriculture than service industries, 46.3 percent and 45.1 percent, respectively. Table 9 shows the distribution of workers by industrial sector among the Muslims was different from this distribution among the Christians in which more than half (57.8%) of them worked in agriculture and 37.1% in services. This pattern was also different from others in which more than half (51.8%) of them worked in the service sector and 41.3% in the agriculture. Manufacturing sector generally absorb much smaller workers.

Table 9. Distribution of Workers by Industry and Religion: Indonesia, 2000

	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Services	Not Stated	Total
Muslims	46.25	8.58	45.10	0.08	100.00
Christians	57.84	4.95	37.12	0.10	100.00
Others	41.27	6.88	51.78	0.07	100.00
Total	47.14	8.19	44.59	0.08	100.00

Source: Author's calculation

As seen in Table 10, taking into account gender in the employment distribution by industry for Muslims only, it seems the difference is not significant, in which Muslim men working in agriculture accounted for 45.7% and in services 45.5% while Muslim women working in agriculture accounted for 47.0% and in services 44.4%. Yet, educational difference on employment by industry was very obvious, where the more educated workers had a higher percentage working in service industry than the primary educated ones. In agriculture industry, the workers were mostly primary educated. However, manufacturing sectors are more likely to employ those holding certificate of junior and senior high schools. The tertiary educated is less likely to work on this sector compared with these groups of lower education.

Table 10. Muslim Workers Aged 15 and above by Industry: Indonesia, 2000

	Agriculture	Manufacturing	Services	Not Stated	Total
Sex					
Male	45.74	8.66	45.54	0.06	100.00
Female	47.00	8.46	44.44	0.10	100.00
Education					
Primary School or Less	59.20	5.75	34.98	0.08	100.00
Junior High School	31.47	14.04	54.40	0.09	100.00
Senior High School	15.08	16.08	68.75	0.08	100.00
Tertiary Education	5.42	7.09	87.42	0.07	100.00

Source: Arifin (2009).

Marital Status

Together with educational attainment, the increasing trend of female labour force participation may result in changes of behaviour towards family formation through, for example, delaying entrance into married life. Some studies have shown that despite the fact that marriage is still universal in Indonesian societies, it is not an exception that the incidence of delayed marriage started to grow (Arifin, 2006; Jones, 2003). As presented by Jones (2003), the percentage of women staying single in their 30s has increased faster than those in their 40s: an increase of about 300% among those in their 30s during 1970-2000. This section will discuss marital status of the Muslims in Indonesia.

Table 11. Marital Status of the Population Aged 15 and above by Religion: Indonesia, 2000

Religion	Single	Married	Divorced	Widowed	Total
Muslims	26.91	65.66	1.83	5.60	100.00
Christians	32.78	60.85	1.24	5.14	100.00
Others	29.40	63.70	1.39	5.51	100.00
Total	27.49	65.18	1.76	5.56	100.00


Source: Author's calculation from the raw data of 2000 population census.

As presented in Table 11, among Muslims aged 15 and above, 65.7 percent of them are married. This percentage was the highest as compared with the Christians and Others. The percentage of single Muslim women was the smallest, but the percentages of widowed and divorced were the highest. Taking into consideration of the age, marriage seems to be universal among Muslims aged 35 to 49, as shown in Figure 10 more than 90% of them are married. This

group is in contrast to the youngest Muslims, 15-19, whose 91.5% were single. An article of the Marriage Law No. 01/1974 stipulates that minimum marriage age of 19 for males and 16 for females; provision for marriage below minimum age, subject to judicial discretion and parental consent.

As presented in Figure 10, the percentage of married Muslims continued to increase until the peak of age group of 35-39 and the percentage kept declining for the aged above 40. At the same time, after reaching 40 year old the proportion of widowed Muslims kept steadily increasing and reached the peak among those aged above 80. More than half of the oldest old Muslims were widowed. This may have an impact on the living arrangement of the elderly Muslims, and social-economic support for them.

Figure 10. Age Pattern of Marital Status for Muslims: Indonesia, 2000



Source: Arifin (2009).

Differentiating for gender, there was no clear difference on the percentage of marriage among men and women (seen in Table 12). However, gender differential exists among other marital statuses such as single, widowed and divorced. Women are more likely to have a higher percentage in each of these categories than men. A stark difference was among the widowed, which indicated a lower rate of remarriage among Muslim women than men.

As more and more young adult Muslims continue their study and participate in the labour market, postponing marriage may become unavoidable. From this perspective, education and labour force participation may lead to the incidence of delayed marriage among Muslims. However, the opposite trend may also occur. Marital status may determine whether someone participates in the labour market or not. Not financially supported by anybody, the single adults

have to work. Among married Muslim couples, they may have to become dual income earners due to growing needs for their children. The figure in Table 12 provides an insight that education plays a role on marital status. Among primary school educated Muslims, 72.2 percent were married, while a much lower percentage of married Muslims was seen among higher educational levels especially junior and senior high schools. More than 70 percent of the tertiary educated Muslims were married. To some extent this pattern indicated a delayed marriage among Muslims due to their education. Employment differentiates people behaviour toward marriage. As seen in Table 8, Muslims whom have a job were more likely to be married, but Muslims who are looking for a job were more likely to be single.

Table 12. Marital Status of Muslims Aged 15 and Above by Background Variables: Indonesia, 2000

Province	Marital Status				Total
	Single	Married	Divorced	Widowed	
Sex					
Male	31.18	65.95	1.15	1.72	100.00
Female	22.67	65.37	2.50	9.45	100.00
Education					
Primary School or Less	17.16	72.24	2.27	8.33	100.00
Junior High School	48.92	48.73	1.19	1.16	100.00
Senior High School	40.37	57.65	1.02	0.96	100.00
Tertiary Education	27.91	70.19	0.88	1.01	100.00
Labour Force participation					
Working	17.22	75.66	2.08	5.05	100.00
Looking for job	76.93	19.94	1.97	1.15	100.00
Not Labour Force	41.81	49.61	1.27	7.31	100.00

Source: Arifin (2009).

In addition, Table 12 also provides an insight of divorce among Muslims in Indonesia. The case of divorce was generally low with less than 2.5 percent of Muslims aged 15 and above and the low percentage of divorcee is seen in all age groups. Considering educational differences, the lower the educational attainment of the Muslims was the higher the percentage of divorcee. This trend has been consistent with the previous study by Guest (1992) that higher proportions of women with higher levels of education within the population have contributed to the declines in divorce. There has been a decline in the incidence of divorce over time which differentials are strongly associated with education and age at marriage. However, in the post Suharto era, under democratic era, there has been an indication of a jump in the divorce incidence from an average of 20,000 a year to more than 200,000 a year over the decade.⁸ This is based on the figure released by the Director General for Islamic guidance at the Religious Affairs Ministry. Some of

⁸ "Divorce rate up 10 fold since reform era: Ministry", *The Jakarta Post*, February 4, 2009. <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/02/04/divorce-rate-10-fold-reform-era-ministry.html>

the possible reasons mentioned probably because Indonesian Muslim women now have a greater awareness of women's rights. Political differences between husband and wife can drive more couples to experience marital dissolution. This new indication deserves further research.

Table 12 also indicates a higher mortality among the lowest educational level as the percentage of widowed Muslims was the highest (8.3 percent) among this group as compared with the higher educational levels (around 1.0 percent only).

Concluding remarks

Muslims constituted a very large percentage (88.2 percent) of total population of Indonesia in 2000. However, Indonesia is not an Islamic country, which implements the shariah as the national law. The Christian (Protestantism and Catholicism) is the largest minority religion in Indonesia, followed by Others (Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and others). Even, Muslims are not the majority in the provinces of Bali, East Nusa Tenggara, North Sulawesi, and Papua, where Muslims constituted less than 30.0 per cent of the total population in the respective province. In addition, Muslims only formed about half of the population in Maluku. Muslims were the majority in West Kalimantan, but they only made 57.6 per cent of the total population.

All Indonesians, regardless their religion, have experienced the joy of democracy since May 1998. Since the fall of Suharto regime in May 1998, which marked the dramatic change from an authoritarian political era to a democratizing era, several Muslim based parties have been established. For example, National Mandate Party was established in August 1998, just three months after the fall of Suharto. In the first democratic general election, in 1999, the Muslim based parties secured about 37.6 percent of the votes, an increase from less than 30.0 percent in the engineered general elections during Suharto era. Even, the Muslim based party (there was only one Muslim based party) only earned about 16.0 percent of the votes in the 1987 election. Yet, the achievement in the 1999 election was still lower than that in the first democratic general election, held in 1955, during the era of Sukarno, the first President of Indonesia. In 1955, the Muslim based parties obtained approximately 44.0 percent of the vote. Though sometimes painful, the democratization has brought much freedom of expression to the Indonesian, particularly the Muslim majority.

The process of democratization has also affected the data collected in the Indonesian population census. Statistics on religion and, particularly ethnicity, were considered a political taboo during Suharto era. However, Abdurrahman Wahid, the second president during the democratizing era, allowed the Indonesia Statistics to collect data on ethnicity. It is during the third president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, that the 2000 Indonesian population census was

conducted. It is the first census asking information on ethnicity since the 1930 population census before Indonesia's independence. The data on ethnicity and religion are now available to the public. However, as discussed in Hull (2001), the democratization also created challenges in collecting data. People then felt that they had the right to refuse the interview.

In the area of economic development, the Suharto era has made a spectacular progress, with a big decline in poverty rate. It also conducted a strong national family planning program since the beginning of the era, as one of the important means to reduce poverty. As a result, fertility rate had been declining relatively very fast. Those who had religion put together in "Others" has the lowest fertility rate, followed by the Muslim majority, and Christians. Not surprisingly, the ageing process is also more advanced among "Others", followed by Muslims, and then Christians.

With district as the unit analysis, the Muslims migrated less than the Christians did. The "Others" migrated the most. However, as Muslims are very large in numbers, the mobility of the Muslims has important impact on population composition by religion in the receiving areas, particularly those where initially the Muslims did not constitute very large percentages of the population.

Interestingly, the Muslims did not do very well in education. Compared to other religious groups, the Muslims had the lowest educational attainment, with 62.0% just at most finishing primary school. The Christians made the best educational attainment, with 63.0 per cent of them having at least junior high school. Others were in between with more than half (55.9%) finished at most primary school. The Dutch influence before the independence may have passed the Christians with educational advantage, including attitude on education and availability of educational facilities.

The Muslims were also the lowest in terms of labour force participation rate. Only about 69.0 per cent of the Muslims worked or looked for job, lower than about 73.0 per cent among the Christians and about 74.0 percent among "Others". It is not clear why the Muslims participated less in the labour market. Is it related to their education, or because they can afford to enjoy being out of labour force? It is also interesting to note that one in two female Muslims aged 15 and above participated in labour force and remained active during their reproductive ages. Similar to the Muslim men, the Muslim women also mostly worked in agricultural and service sectors.

A rapid trend of ageing population among Muslims in Indonesia is one of emerging challenges towards the twenty-first century. The size of the silver Indonesian Muslims is getting larger but at the same time Indonesia per capita income as argued by Ananta and Arifin (2008a) will not be as advanced as those in developed countries, though the future older persons will also be better educated and more urbanized. Issues and policies on active ageing population

have and will become increasingly important challenges in the near future as the ageing process among Muslim Indonesians will accelerate much faster than its economy.

This paper shows that though the decline in fertility rate is the primary factor in the process of ageing population, migration plays an equally important role in the process. Geographical movement of Indonesians has become more complex and unconventional. Male and female Muslim Indonesians are equally mobile, migrating globally and internally within Indonesia. Feminisation of international migration of Muslim Indonesians has been an emerging feature and will remain for the next several decades. Its intensity and volume have continued to increase due to smaller family size units, longer life expectancies, advances in information technology, telecommunication and transportation, government policies such as on collective leave and arrangement of public holidays, and emerging democratic values. Conflicting values and norms among Muslim and non-Muslim Indonesians as well as foreigners can be another challenge and should be anticipated and handled appropriately as this paper has described an increasing number of foreigners visit, work, and live in Indonesia. The government should continue to work to reduce the demographic and socio-economic gap.

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